2294 part 1 final report.pdf - Agra CEAS Consulting

More documents

Recommendations

Info

Prevention and control of animal diseases worldwide Part I: Economic analysis: prevention versus outbreak costs 5.2.3. Costs of outbreaks Vietnam’s losses from the AI epidemic have been extensively covered by literature, making this one of the best-documented countries on the subject. Table 14 provides a picture of the direct and indirect impacts based on a selection from the available literature 117 . A more detailed calculation of the direct production costs and losses (including culling and control costs), based on the available literature and certain assumptions, is provided in Table 15. A total 44 million birds were culled/died after the first HPAI outbreak in 2004. Although compensation was applied, this was judged to be at low level and reportedly acted as a disincentive for farmers to report the disease on time (A3, A258). Table 14 Vietnam: selected direct and indirect impacts of AI outbreaks (a) Direct costs and losses Production losses Compensation Culling & control costs Consequential on-farm losses In the first outbreak in 2004, 58 out of 64 Provinces were affected, and 17% of the total national poultry flock of 262 million birds (about 44 million) lost. The loss in terms of the value of birds was estimated at VND 800 billion (assuming an average farm gate price for chicken of VND 20,000 before AI) or US$ 53 million. According to other sources the value of the birds lost is even higher. In the second wave of outbreaks, the costs were smaller due to a less drastic approach to culling in which clinically infected birds only were slaughtered, and because the disease spread less. (A9, A16, A91, A204, A292) The central government budget allocated to AI compensation up to June 2005 amounted to VND 268 billion (US$ 17.2 million) (A3). It was estimated to cost about US$ 0.25 per bird to cull and dispose approximately 200 chickens per farm (A7, A9, A91). Containing the first epidemic in 2004 is estimated to have costs the government about VND 400 billion (US$ 27 million) including the temporary labour for culling and disinfection, hiring of equipment etc. (A204) The loss of income, assuming poultry production fell to zero for a period of 3 months (during the moratorium on re-stocking), would amount to around VND 1.6 trillion (US$107 million), which is considered a realistic estimate of the actual losses caused by the 2004 crisis. (A204). The number of rural households directly involved in poultry production, predominantly carried out by women, is reported to have fallen by 50% (A40, A91). Total direct impact The WB has estimated the total direct impact in terms of the poultry sector’s contribution to GDP (0.6% Vietnam before the HPAI epidemic). With poultry output down by around 15%, this part of economic loss is worth about 0.1% of GDP or about $45 million. On the other hand there have also been important substitution effects, especially towards production of pork. Combining these effects, the direct cost in Vietnam may be around 0.12% of GDP. 117 It is noted that the literature available on this subject in some cases may provide conflicting information due to the assumptions and base data used, e.g. on the bird value. The various results have therefore been calibrated and updated with latest evidence to provide a more accurate picture of the impact. Civic Consulting • Agra CEAS Consulting 112
Prevention and control of animal diseases worldwide Part I: Economic analysis: prevention versus outbreak costs (A140, A140a) Indirect impact: ripple effects Prices of substitute products Poultry prices and sales Feed industry Wholesale markets A 2004 FAO survey found that in Vietnam, prices of non-poultry meats rose up to 30% when live-bird markets were disrupted by the AI outbreaks and remained high even after the poultry markets recovered, taking the purchase of meat out of reach for low income consumers. (A40) At the lowest point of the HPAI crisis (Oct/Nov 2005), prices were 50-60% below normal, and the volume of poultry sales reported to have fallen by half, from about 40 million poultry per month to 20 million. When prices started recovering in December they were 30-60% lower than pre-outbreak levels, but supermarket prices were 25-35% higher (in fact these farmers and markets that sold certified products were able to capture higher prices). The volumes sold daily (poultry and eggs) were lower than pre-outbreak levels. (All unofficial data.) (A9) The AI outbreaks have had a sharp effect on feed manufacturers, particularly those selling to semi-commercial producers. For instance, one major manufacturer reported a drop of 90% in feed production while another reported a drop of 60-70%. The cost of commercial feed accounts for up to 70% of the cost of raising industrial chicken, and Vietnam’s poultry sector normally consumes an estimated 8-10 mt/year of complete feed, nearly all of which is directed toward semi-commercial and industrial farms. (A9) The reorganisation of HCMC’s chicken and egg production following the HPAI outbreaks (and the need to ensure product safety) led to a decline in the number of wholesale egg markets from 134 to 75, while the number of poultry markets fell from 1,550 to 7 (excluding supermarkets). (A9) (a) The literature available on this subject may in some cases provide conflicting information due to the assumptions and base data used, e.g. on the bird value. The various results have therefore been calibrated and updated with latest evidence to provide a more accurate picture of the impact. Source: compiled by Agra CEAS Consulting Table 15 Vietnam: calculation of total direct costs of HPAI outbreaks (2004-05) VND USD (b) Total costs (2005) (a) 797,300,000,000 51,108,974 Total costs (2004-5) (a) 1,936,970,000,000 124,164,744 Total compensation provided (1) 267,991,000,000 17,178,910 Value of culled animals per head (2) 40,000 2.56 Compensation provided per head (3) 5,000 0.32 Restocking subsidy per head (4) 2,000 0.13 Culling and disposal costs per head (5) 3,900 0.25 Civic Consulting • Agra CEAS Consulting 113
Page 1 and 2:
The World Organisation for Animal H
Page 3 and 4:
Expert Team Agra CEAS Consulting: M
Page 5 and 6:
Prevention and control of animal di
Page 7 and 8:
Page 9 and 10:
Page 11 and 12:
Page 13 and 14:
Page 15 and 16:
Page 17 and 18:
Page 19 and 20:
Page 21 and 22:
Page 23 and 24:
Page 25 and 26:
Page 27 and 28:
Page 29 and 30:
Page 31 and 32:
Page 33 and 34:
Page 35 and 36:
Page 37 and 38:
Page 39 and 40:
Page 41 and 42:
Page 43 and 44:
Page 45 and 46:
Page 47 and 48:
Page 49 and 50:
Page 51 and 52:
Page 53 and 54:
Page 55 and 56:
Page 57 and 58:
Page 59 and 60:
Page 61 and 62:
Page 63 and 64:
Page 65 and 66:
Page 67 and 68:
Page 69 and 70:
Page 71 and 72:
Page 73 and 74:
Page 75 and 76: Prevention and control of animal di
Page 125: Prevention and control of animal di
Page 177 and 178:
Page 179 and 180:
Page 181 and 182:
Page 183 and 184:
Page 185 and 186:
Page 187 and 188:
Page 189 and 190:
Page 191 and 192:
Page 193 and 194:
Page 195 and 196:
Page 197 and 198:
Page 199 and 200:
Page 201 and 202:
Annexes Prevention and control of a
Page 203 and 204:
Page 205 and 206:
Page 207 and 208:
Page 209 and 210:
Page 211 and 212:
Page 213 and 214:
Page 215 and 216:
Page 217 and 218:
Page 219 and 220:
Page 221 and 222:
Page 223 and 224:
Country Title Date Programme durati
Page 225 and 226:
Country Title Date Programme durati
Page 227 and 228:
Page 229 and 230:
Page 231 and 232:
Page 233 and 234:
Page 235 and 236:
Page 237 and 238:
Page 239 and 240:
Page 241 and 242:
Page 243 and 244:
Page 245 and 246:
Page 247 and 248:
Page 249 and 250:
Page 251:
show all

2294 part 1 final report.pdf - Agra CEAS Consulting

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?