2294 part 1 final report.pdf - Agra CEAS Consulting
2294 part 1 final report.pdf - Agra CEAS Consulting
2294 part 1 final report.pdf - Agra CEAS Consulting
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Prevention and control of animal diseases worldwide<br />
Part I: Economic analysis: prevention versus outbreak costs<br />
However, given the dependence on the poultry sector of poverty stricken households in the developing<br />
world and especially the least developed countries, the culling and high mortality of birds has a significant<br />
impact on their livelihoods 85 . This impact is compounded by the consequential on-farm losses and the<br />
broader indirect effects discussed below.<br />
It is noted that in a given production system, an inverse relationship appears to exist between production<br />
losses and control costs, in that the higher the treatment and control expenditure the lower the losses and<br />
vice versa. Moreover, this relationship between losses and expenditure is non-linear reflecting the nonlinear<br />
nature of the classical production function (A115).<br />
4.3.2.2. Control costs<br />
This type of cost is rarely documented with data. Only in the case of FMD outbreaks in developed<br />
countries (e.g. UK), and the more recent HPAI outbreaks in both developed and developing countries,<br />
these costs were explored in depth.<br />
Given the data scarcity, any global estimates of the control costs available by literature usually draw on<br />
the above cases. For example, the African assessment of needs and gaps in the context of HPAI (A258)<br />
evaluates the operational cost of the culling team activities, disinfection of premises and disposal of dead<br />
birds taking into consideration the experience of two of the most documented cases: Vietnam and Nigeria<br />
(Table 7).<br />
4.3.2.3. Other direct production losses<br />
Widely referred to as consequential on-farm losses, these depend on the period that the farmers stay out of<br />
production during and after the crisis is over. These types of losses are generally not well documented in<br />
the literature and therefore difficult to assess and quantify.<br />
In the case of HPAI, given that poultry restocking should normally take place only a minimum of 3-4<br />
weeks after the premises have been cleaned and disinfected (following OIE and FAO recommendations<br />
but also as demonstrated in practice in the countries affected by HPAI – see for example A91), a month<br />
can be considered as the minimum disruption period.<br />
A distinction should be made between restocking in the village and backyard farming system, which<br />
appears to be an autonomous process, and restocking in commercial and industrial systems. Generally, the<br />
main problems that farms in the latter sector encounter in continuing with poultry raising are related to the<br />
high prices of inputs, difficulties in procuring day-old chicks and fear of resurgence of Avian Influenza.<br />
Evidence has shown that even without these problems, it takes a long time to re-stock to pre-outbreak<br />
levels. For example, with no constraints to restocking (i.e. assuming day-old chicks and other inputs are<br />
readily available) the time taken to complete restocking in Vietnam was estimated to be 12 months for the<br />
backyard system and 5 to 8 months for the industrial and commercial systems (A91). These losses can be<br />
mitigated if farmers can switch to alternative production, as was the case for example with certain farmers<br />
85 It is noted that the impact of HPAI on small holders of poultry is not new, as these holders are accustomed to<br />
large losses through NCD.<br />
Civic <strong>Consulting</strong> • <strong>Agra</strong> <strong>CEAS</strong> <strong>Consulting</strong> 71