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Education Sector Corruption in Ethiopia 79
need to be addressed, regardless of the extent to which those risks may
currently be giving rise to actual corrupt practices. 7
In view of the limited scope and scale of this study, the modest sample
size, and potential distortion of some of the responses because of
the sensitive subject matter, care has been taken not to read too much
into the details of the responses within each stakeholder group. Instead,
broad findings have been derived from an analysis of the overall
response pattern within each group, with due account taken of triangulation
of responses to different questions within each group. The resulting
risk ratings are necessarily of a tentative nature, based as they are on
an interpretation of a combination of stakeholder responses and the
results of the literature review within the broader context of international
experience in the sector.
Mapping of Upstream Corruption Risks
Public actors in Ethiopia’s education sector include actors from the international
community; national, regional, and woreda governmental
departments; and agencies with both education and noneducation functions.
Most upstream corruption risks within these government entities
would typically entail interactions between public sector actors only.
Such interactions could include either “vertical” interactions—down the
education hierarchy from the center down to the region, woreda, institutions,
and individuals—or “horizontal” interactions involving various line
departments, agencies, and individuals at a similar level of government. In
the case of policy development, there may also be collusion between
public officials and private sector entities with a vested interest in promoting,
or preventing, specific policies or regulations.
The risk of each of the specific forms of upstream corruption, referenced
previously in table 3.1, will now be addressed in turn.
Policy development
Policy capture—risk: low. Policy capture occurs when a private company,
or an elite group, improperly influences policy to further its vested interests.
A hypothetical example for the former would be when one or more
private companies make secret payments such that policies are adopted
that allow for restricted competition, or effective monopolies, in the provision
of goods or services to the education sector. An example of the
latter could be the capture of policy by politicians with regional or ethnic
biases, by particular social groups, or by any powerful individuals with a
vested interest in promoting an agenda that benefits themselves or their