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Complete Book PDF (4.12MB) - World Bank eLibrary

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146 Diagnosing Corruption in Ethiopia<br />

Box 4.3<br />

Contract Design, Tendering, and Procurement: Corruption<br />

Risk Examples<br />

Some interviewees cited examples of corrupt practices in contract design,<br />

tendering, and procurement, as summarized below.<br />

• Favoritism in design specs. Preparation of design specifications may favor one<br />

company, or group of companies, over another. For example, if the tender includes<br />

the drilling of both shallow boreholes and deeper ones, only those companies<br />

with higher-capacity rigs would be able to compete. Similarly, tenders<br />

may require contractors to meet specific requirements in terms of equipment,<br />

personnel, and experience. Such preconditions may be entirely legitimate, but<br />

some interviewees noted that they can also be used to skew contracts unfairly<br />

to favored firms.<br />

• Spurious items or activities in the design specification. For example, the tender<br />

may include activities that favored firms would know are unnecessary, such as<br />

a requirement to carry out five-day pumping tests on each borehole. Such<br />

activities might add considerably to costs, yet those close to the evaluation<br />

process would enter artificially low costs, or no costs at all, for this line item to<br />

undercut less-knowledgeable bidders.<br />

• Conflicts of interest in the selection of evaluation committee members. For example,<br />

a regional bureau head may be serving on a committee evaluating a tender<br />

in which the regional (state) drilling company is competing (bureau heads usually<br />

chair or are board members of state-owned drilling companies).<br />

• Arbitrary exclusion of bids on spurious technical or licensing grounds. Such exclusion<br />

of bids might cite criteria that are introduced only during the evaluation<br />

process.<br />

• Interference in the bidding process. For example, a senior politician dictates the<br />

type of process to be followed (such as single-source or preselection) or directly<br />

determines the outcome.<br />

• Collusion among contractors to rig the bidding process. For example, firms agree<br />

among themselves which tenders to bid for to reduce competition and inflate<br />

prices.<br />

• Use of “contract variations” to extend the work of a contracted company beyond<br />

the original contract. For example, company X could be requested to complete<br />

a further 50 boreholes in area Y on the back of an existing contract, without<br />

the need for another tender.

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