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Complete Book PDF (4.12MB) - World Bank eLibrary

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Corruption in the Mining Sector: Preliminary Overview 403<br />

mineral sales—thus reducing the mine’s reported net profit, in turn<br />

reducing the income tax paid to the licensing authority.<br />

• Inspectors and auditors solicit or accept bribes to agree with false<br />

declarations.<br />

• Mining is conducted without a license, and output is not declared.<br />

• Mining is conducted outside the scope of the license, and output is not<br />

declared.<br />

° While carrying out its mining operation, the mining company may<br />

uncover a mineral for which it does not have a license. Instead of<br />

applying for the license, it may mine the additional mineral illegally<br />

and transport it off-site for sale without declaring it to the licensing<br />

authority and without paying royalty or profit tax on it.<br />

• Mining companies illegally export mining products.<br />

° A mining company may reduce its royalties and income tax payable<br />

to the licensing authority by illegally exporting part of its production<br />

out of the country. It may pay a bribe to an official to assist it in this<br />

purpose.<br />

• Mining products are sold illegally within Ethiopia.<br />

Existing mining revenue procedures<br />

Collection of royalties and income tax apparently depends almost entirely<br />

on the mining companies’ self-certification of output and profit because<br />

of the lack of resources at the Ethiopian federal, regional, and city licensing<br />

authority levels. It would, therefore, be relatively easy for the mining<br />

companies to exaggerate their capital and operating costs and understate<br />

their output and profit.<br />

In addition, artisanal mines currently appear to be an almost impossible<br />

problem to monitor—bearing in mind the large number of artisanal<br />

mines, the number of illegal mines, the small scale of the operations, the<br />

high labor element of the mining, the lack of records kept by artisanal<br />

mines, and the fact that the miners often personally keep and sell their<br />

own share of the output. The shortage of inspectors makes it difficult to<br />

find out about and monitor these mines, and it is also possible that local<br />

officials may extort bribes from artisanal miners in exchange for not<br />

reporting their illegal mining activities.<br />

The risk of large-scale corruption in the payment of up-front premiums<br />

to the government is eliminated by the fact that the Ethiopian government<br />

does not currently require such payments. In some other<br />

countries, this premium can be the largest single source of corruption.<br />

However, the Ethiopian government does currently receive up-front

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