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Justice Sector Corruption in Ethiopia 223
rare; other observers hold that they are not that unusual. Whatever the
answer, proving judicial complicity is a difficult charge, especially given
the simultaneous emphasis on augmenting judicial independence.
The role of private attorneys in this process is highly relevant, and for
this reason that role has been treated separately in the value chain. Many
attorneys served on the bench (if only to fulfill the requirements for
licensing) and then left, either attracted by high salaries and greater independence
in private practice or because they had problems with the
evolving evaluation system. However, they retain contacts with their former
colleagues, and this, many believed, is a foundation for corrupt practices.
Certainly, in common parlance, the first question asked by a client
is said to be “Do you know the judge?” It is presumed that if the answer
is “yes,” the lawyer will be able to negotiate a favorable decision.
Moreover—and contrary to the example cited above—when larger
amounts are involved, “experts” assert that lawyers or other go-betweens
are used and that the party and the judge never discuss the matter.
A third scenario—not stressed by informants but certainly visible in
some discussions—concerned large lawsuits involving foreign clients,
some of whom were said to instruct their lawyers to “just make the judge
happy.” Given relatively low judicial salaries (from Br 2,100 plus housing
and transportation allowances for a federal First Instance judge to roughly
Br 6,000 plus free housing and a car for Supreme Court justices), a sizable
payment could be tempting, but such cases were only discussed
hypothetically; no one offered examples.
A final piece of information, which could not be verified, involved the
rumored investigation of 12 judges in the Addis Ababa municipal land
courts. Informants did not specify whether they were “real” judges (part
of the Addis municipal courts) or members of a special executive tribunal.
In any event, the FEACC refused to comment on the rumor
although its own publications do confirm its ongoing investigation of the
land agency. Both FEACC members and other informants did agree that
taxes, land, and customs attract corruption, although they were probably
referring to what occurs within the executive branch. Administrative
manipulation of land issues does generate cases between private parties;
in the other areas, any litigation is likely to be administrative or criminal
(corruption).
Labor cases were also mentioned because of a presumed pro-labor bias
on the part of some judges. The one example given was of a woreda judge
(thus a member of a regional judiciary, although not in Amhara) who
wrote the pleadings for a labor case on which he later presided. Like most