Complete Book PDF (4.12MB) - World Bank eLibrary

Recommendations

Info

196 Diagnosing Corruption in Ethiopia Table 5.1 (continued) Execution of budget Management of nonfinancial resources Management of funds collected by courts Detection of alleged crime Investigation of crime and pretrial procedures a. System Organization • Government-accredited bar associations sell licenses or award them on a nonmerit basis or manage discipline of own members to either favor colleagues or ignore their misbehavior. • Public sector actors create slush funds or divert funds to nonofficial uses. • Private and public actors collude through bribes, kickbacks, and sweetheart contracts. • Public actors manipulate salaries or other benefits to reward or punish other public (and entrusted) actors. • Private citizens make “contributions” to augment public actors’ salaries or improve benefits and so ensure favorable treatment. • Public employees steal equipment and materials. • Public and private actors collude through bribes or kickbacks on maintenance contracts. • Public actors distribute equipment and other resources based on political clout or favoritism. • Public actors who collect funds do not turn them over in full, but pocket some or all. • Public and private actors collude to falsely record what is paid and split the difference. • “Entrusted officials” charged with collecting fees (e.g., Brazil’s cartórios) do not turn them over to the court. b. Criminal Justice Potential forms of corruption • Political authorities or higher-level officials direct police to ignore a complaint, undertake an investigation, or arrest a “suspect” without probable cause. • Police take regular payments from those running criminal activities or ordinary businesses in exchange for ignoring infractions. • Police solicit or accept bribes or other considerations to process or ignore complaints. • Police solicit or accept bribes or other considerations to arrest or release suspects. • Lawyers collude with private clients to threaten criminal complaints to extort money or force other actions of “probable suspect.” • Political authorities or higher-level officers direct police to falsify or ignore evidence. • Police steal valuable evidence. • Political authorities or higher-level officers direct prosecutors to file or not file charges. • Political authorities manipulate assignment of the “right” judge (prosecutor or investigator) to handle the case. (continued next page)
Justice Sector Corruption in Ethiopia 197 Table 5.1 Trial and appeal (continued) b. Criminal Justice • Political authorities pressure prosecutors or judges to request or require pretrial detention, refuse bail, or set bail higher or lower than necessary. • Political authorities pressure judges or prison staff to restrict pretrial detainees’ legal rights. • Public authorities solicit bribes from detainees for access to counsel or other legal rights. • Political authorities instruct judges, prosecutors, or public defenders to speed up or slow down proceedings. • Political or higher-level officers pressure judges or others (including private attorneys) regarding decisions on evidence or other matters. • Police or prosecutors solicit or accept bribes or other consideration from parties to falsify or hide evidence. • Lawyers or other court experts falsify or retain evidence to aid principal clients or as means of extorting money from other parties. • Prosecutors solicit or accept bribes or other consideration from parties to drop or reduce charges. • Prosecutors file charges to “punish” the suspect (abuse of authority). • Political or governmental actors pressure potential witnesses to not come forward. • Lawyers or clients purchase false testimony from civilian or expert witnesses. • Public or private actors solicit or offer bribes to influence case assignments. • Lawyers or clients offer (or accede to) bribes or other considerations to affect decisions on pretrial detention and bail. • Lawyers ask clients for money to “pay off” the judge or prosecutor but instead pocket the funds. • Public or “pro bono” defenders solicit fees from defendants or clients. • Lawyers or clients offer (or accede to) bribes or other considerations to influence scheduling of events. • Lawyers or clients offer (or accede to) bribes or other considerations to affect responses to motions to eliminate evidence, exclude witnesses, or dismiss parts of complaints. • Political or higher judicial authorities direct judges as to how to rule. • Political authorities direct public defense lawyers or private attorneys to mishandle cases. • Political authorities or higher-level officials direct judges to accept or not accept appeals. • Parties or political authorities engage in jury tampering (if juries are used). (continued next page)
Page 1:
DIRECTIONS IN DEVELOPMENT Public Se
Page 5 and 6:
Diagnosing Corruption in Ethiopia P
Page 7 and 8:
Contents Foreword Preface About the
Page 9 and 10:
Contents vii Chapter 6 Construction
Page 11 and 12:
Contents ix Map 3.1 Ethiopian Regio
Page 13 and 14:
Contents xi 3.6 Summary of Corrupti
Page 15 and 16:
Foreword The government of the Fede
Page 17 and 18:
Preface Although many would argue t
Page 19:
Preface xvii Goldie-Scot, Piers Cro
Page 22 and 23:
xx About the Editor and Authors bil
Page 24 and 25:
xxii About the Editor and Authors g
Page 26 and 27:
xxiv Abbreviations GAC Governance a
Page 29 and 30:
CHAPTER 1 Overview Janelle Plummer
Page 31 and 32:
Overview 3 Focusing on Ethiopia, th
Page 33 and 34:
Overview 5 for their knowledge of c
Page 35 and 36:
Overview 7 and group discussion wit
Page 37 and 38:
Overview 9 analysis, Goldie-Scot ge
Page 39 and 40:
Overview 11 Chapter 8: Telecommunic
Page 41 and 42:
Overview 13 might be explained by t
Page 43 and 44:
Overview 15 The perceptions of corr
Page 45:
Overview 17 Given the Ethiopian gov
Page 48 and 49:
20 Diagnosing Corruption in Ethiopi
Page 50 and 51:
Page 52 and 53:
Page 54 and 55:
Page 56 and 57:
Page 58 and 59:
Page 60 and 61:
Page 62 and 63:
Page 64 and 65:
Page 66 and 67:
Page 68 and 69:
Page 70 and 71:
Page 72 and 73:
44 Figure 2.4 Corruption Vulnerabil
Page 74 and 75:
Page 76 and 77:
Page 78 and 79:
Page 80 and 81:
Page 82 and 83:
Page 84 and 85:
Page 86 and 87:
Page 88 and 89:
Page 90 and 91:
Page 92 and 93:
Page 94 and 95:
Page 96 and 97:
Page 98 and 99:
Page 100 and 101:
Page 102 and 103:
Page 104 and 105:
Page 106 and 107:
Page 108 and 109:
Page 110 and 111:
Page 112 and 113:
Page 114 and 115:
Page 116 and 117:
Page 118 and 119:
Page 120 and 121:
Page 122 and 123:
Page 124 and 125:
Page 126 and 127:
Page 128 and 129:
100 Diagnosing Corruption in Ethiop
Page 130 and 131:
Page 132 and 133:
Page 134 and 135:
Page 136 and 137:
Page 138 and 139:
Page 140 and 141:
Page 142 and 143:
Page 144 and 145:
Page 146 and 147:
Page 148 and 149:
Page 150 and 151:
Page 152 and 153:
Page 154 and 155:
Page 156 and 157:
Page 158 and 159:
Page 160 and 161:
Page 162 and 163:
Page 164 and 165:
Page 166 and 167:
Page 168 and 169:
Page 170 and 171:
Page 172 and 173:
Page 174 and 175: 146 Diagnosing Corruption in Ethiop
Page 182 and 183: 154 Table 4.4 Value chain area Cons
Page 200 and 201: Annex 4.1 Ethiopian RWS Borehole St
Page 209 and 210: CHAPTER 5 Justice Sector Corruption
Page 211 and 212: Justice Sector Corruption in Ethiop
Page 223: Justice Sector Corruption in Ethiop
Page 233 and 234: Table 5.2 Disposition of Civil and
Page 265 and 266: CHAPTER 6 Construction Sector Corru
Page 267 and 268: Construction Sector Corruption in E
Page 275 and 276:
Construction Sector Corruption in E
Page 277 and 278:
Page 279 and 280:
Page 281 and 282:
Page 283 and 284:
Page 285 and 286:
Page 287 and 288:
Page 289 and 290:
Page 291 and 292:
Table 6.7 Overview of Perceived Cor
Page 293 and 294:
Page 295 and 296:
Page 297 and 298:
Page 299 and 300:
Page 301 and 302:
Page 303 and 304:
Page 305 and 306:
Figure 6.5 Drivers of Corruption Ri
Page 307 and 308:
Page 309 and 310:
Page 311:
Page 314 and 315:
Page 316 and 317:
Page 318 and 319:
Page 320 and 321:
292 Table 7.1 Upstream Value Chain
Page 322 and 323:
Page 324 and 325:
Page 326 and 327:
Page 328 and 329:
Page 330 and 331:
Page 332 and 333:
Page 334 and 335:
Page 336 and 337:
Page 338 and 339:
Page 340 and 341:
Page 342 and 343:
Page 344 and 345:
Page 346 and 347:
Page 348 and 349:
Page 350 and 351:
Page 352 and 353:
Page 354 and 355:
Page 356 and 357:
Page 358 and 359:
Page 360 and 361:
Page 362 and 363:
Page 364 and 365:
336 Figure 8.2 Current Institutiona
Page 366 and 367:
Page 368 and 369:
Page 370 and 371:
Page 372 and 373:
Page 374 and 375:
Page 376 and 377:
Page 378 and 379:
Page 380 and 381:
Page 382 and 383:
Page 384 and 385:
Page 386 and 387:
Page 388 and 389:
Page 390 and 391:
Page 392 and 393:
Page 394 and 395:
Page 396 and 397:
Page 398 and 399:
Page 400 and 401:
Page 402 and 403:
Page 405 and 406:
CHAPTER 9 Corruption in the Mining
Page 407 and 408:
Corruption in the Mining Sector: Pr
Page 409 and 410:
Page 411 and 412:
Page 413 and 414:
Page 415 and 416:
Page 417 and 418:
Page 419 and 420:
Page 421 and 422:
Page 423 and 424:
Page 425 and 426:
Page 427 and 428:
Page 429 and 430:
Page 431 and 432:
Page 433 and 434:
Page 435 and 436:
Page 437 and 438:
Page 439 and 440:
Page 441 and 442:
Page 443 and 444:
Page 445:
show all

Complete Book PDF (4.12MB) - World Bank eLibrary

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?