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Complete Book PDF (4.12MB) - World Bank eLibrary

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Justice Sector Corruption in Ethiopia 217<br />

Table 5.4 (continued)<br />

Enforcement of judgment<br />

Source: Author.<br />

Potential forms of corruption<br />

• Lawyers solicit money from clients to bribe any of<br />

actors, but they pocket the funds.<br />

• Lawyers or parties offer or agree to pay to affect decisions<br />

on licenses to appeal and appellate judgments.<br />

• Political authorities or higher judicial leaders direct<br />

whether and how enforcement will be effected.<br />

• Parties offer or agree to pay to arrange early release or<br />

nonincarceration. Same with any payment of damages.<br />

All of these examples were mentioned in interviews with police,<br />

the ethics and anticorruption commissions, and outside observers. Unfortu<br />

nately, it was impossible to get data from any agency to determine how<br />

frequently these complaints were made, let alone how often they were<br />

true. Many of the resulting problems (failure of witnesses or defendant to<br />

appear, problems with evidence) could also be attributed to overwork,<br />

incompetence, or inadequate logistical support (for example, vehicles,<br />

address directories, and so on). Aside from simple monetary corruption<br />

(bribes), it was mentioned that relationships or political pressures (often<br />

from a local authority) could also be at fault. This is corruption but of a<br />

different kind.<br />

Interestingly, no one expressed a belief that higher-level political corruption<br />

was a frequent explanation—and all seemed to believe that, in<br />

most cases, the monetary values involved were relatively small. This is one<br />

reason the FEACC prefers to send these cases back to the police for<br />

investigation and possibly for disciplinary action short of dismissal. The<br />

FEACC does its own investigation only when high police officials are<br />

involved or when the police take too long to do it themselves. Police<br />

records, to the extent they exist, did not allow for a winnowing out of<br />

corruption cases as opposed to other types of complaints (for example,<br />

abusive treatment, insubordination, excessive force, or shirking of duty).<br />

Prosecutors. A national commission established to review problems of<br />

criminal justice has developed a long list of shortcomings related to prosecutorial<br />

performance. As with the police, some of these could involve<br />

corruption, but others may be overwork, incompetence, or inefficient<br />

work procedures. The anticorruption commissions had received relatively

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