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Corruption in the Telecommunications Sector in Ethiopia: A Preliminary Overview 355
bounds of its financial autonomy, it does not appear that the Auditor
General would have the mandate to conduct a financial audit of the
ETC or the capacity to conduct a performance audit, should that be
required. The entity responsible for auditing state-owned enterprises in
Ethiopia is the ASC, itself a government-owned corporation. No
attempt was made in this study to obtain access to those audits.
• Compliance with corporate anticorruption compliance programs. Over
the past decade in general, and since 2005 in particular, major international
corporations have significantly changed their commercial
behavior. Whereas in the past companies from many Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries could
expect tax incentives from their governments to win lucrative international
contracts, such practices are now illegal and subject to punitive
fines, potential debarment, and possible imprisonment of senior
managers. As a result, most responsible companies working from
OECD countries have now established, or are establishing, internal
safeguards and procedures to guard against, in particular, the risk of
bribes being paid to foreign public officials. This enhanced level of
awareness of the need to avoid both the real and the perceived risk
of corruption does not yet extend to some companies from non-
OECD countries, particularly those countries that have only recently
acceded to the WTO.
• Scrutiny by civil society organizations (CSOs). Civil society in Ethiopia
is relatively weak compared with other countries in Africa. Where
CSOs do exist, they are more subject to government influence.
• Investigation by the FEACC. The FEACC has undoubtedly achieved a
great deal, both by raising awareness of corruption risks and by undertaking
specific investigations related to the ETC. There is, however, a sense of
mismatch between the underlying substance of the investigations and the
eventual action being taken against key responsible officials. This has led
some observers, albeit those with underlying political agendas of their
own, to question the degree to which the FEACC is indeed independent
of the government. The FEACC has a full-time ethics officer within the
ETC, primarily as part of its awareness-raising and training function but
also having some whistle-blowing and investigative powers.
Therefore, the primary line of defense against corruption risks in Ethiopia’s
telecoms sector lies in the ETC’s internal processes and procedures.