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Complete Book PDF (4.12MB) - World Bank eLibrary

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210 Diagnosing Corruption in Ethiopia<br />

Table 5.3 Corruption Risks in Human Resource Management in Ethiopia’s<br />

Justice Sector<br />

Human resource<br />

management<br />

• Selection of judges, prosecutors, defenders, police, their<br />

staffs (and entrusted officials): merit component reduced<br />

by politically directed selection based on nepotism,<br />

political contacts, or the selection group’s choice to create<br />

their own internal networks<br />

• Selection of judges, prosecutors, defenders, police, their staffs,<br />

and private entrusted actors: merit component ignored, and<br />

replaced by bribes, exchanges of favors, or networks of<br />

influence mobilized by candidates<br />

• Assignment of personnel to positions and promotions<br />

directed by political authorities: based on favoritism and<br />

political contacts or influenced by employees, based on bribes<br />

or promises of future favors<br />

• Assignment of personnel: based on bribes or other influence by<br />

external (nongovernmental) patrons<br />

• Disciplinary system: used by political actors to punish<br />

those (including private entrusted actors) who resist<br />

pressures and bribes and to reward those who acquiesce<br />

• Disciplinary decisions: based on bribes or other influence by<br />

external (nongovernmental) patrons<br />

• Public sector oversight of private bar performance and licensing<br />

of these and other officers of the court: decisions based on<br />

bribes or favoritism<br />

• Licenses and discipline from government-accredited bar<br />

associations: sold or awarded on nonmerit basis or discipline of<br />

own members managed to either favor colleagues or ignore<br />

their misbehavior<br />

Source: Author.<br />

reduces or misallocates budgets and equipment) but is less likely to<br />

provide an incentive to corruption in other parts of the agency. 17<br />

As shown in the table 5.3 (an extract from table 5.1), the possibilities<br />

are various—ranging from systems where jobs are bought (with the<br />

expectations that the incumbent will then recoup his or her losses<br />

accordingly) to those where the process is tightly controlled from the top<br />

or outside to create a chain or network of faithful followers. Many of<br />

these problems were not reported in Ethiopia; only those in bold were<br />

reported to be in effect, although as further discussed, there was disagreement<br />

even here. The same system and caveats apply to the following<br />

sections as well.<br />

As indicated by the bolded comments, Ethiopia’s personnel management<br />

within the sector has some flaws, but they hardly extend to the full

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