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118 Diagnosing Corruption in Ethiopia
4. The requirement is for a framework that can also be used in each country
context to locate concentrations of corruption, identify unknowns, plot shifts
in corruption activity, and identify links within the corruption matrix.
5. This interactions-based approach is driven by (a) a need to build broad stakeholder
commitment and a coalition for change and (b) a strong belief that the
corruption problem in the sector should be articulated in terms of the actions
of all public, private, and civil society actors and institutions. It is also pursued
knowing that policy actions are more likely to influence the public sector
than other actors and that more policy options are available to public actors.
Understandably, given that education is usually a monopoly (the state provides,
finances, owns, and regulates the sector), this approach places the
public office at the core of the interaction framework and emphasizes that
the public officer or agency interacts with three other sets of actors—the
other public actors and agencies; the private actors and companies; and consumers,
civil society, and its representative organizations—across the cycle,
from central policy planning down to actual service delivery.
6. Trends for quality are mixed, with proxy indicators deteriorating, stagnating,
or slowly improving. The last three years of National Learning Assessments
results show that educational attainment at grades 4 and 8 has declined year
on year, but grade 5 completion rates have improved.
7. The MOE notes that for many of the corruption risks highlighted below,
regulations and guidelines are in place to mitigate them (MOE 2010).
8. Such concerns are not limited to the education sector and relate to both
(a) the dominant role of the ruling party in decision making and (b) perceived
obstacles to the role of the private sector. Although PASDEP places the private
sector closer to the center of development policy than before, some observers
say it does not yet include policy proposals that, by ensuring a level playing
field, permit the private sector to play its true role. Neither of these areas of
concern necessarily relates directly to corruption, but they do raise concern
among some stakeholders about possible indirect corruption risks. The specific
risk of political capture of budget support, as historically perceived by some
donors in 2006, is described in the “Other Study Findings” section below.
9. In “World Bank vs. Ethiopia: Response to Dr. Ishac Diwan’s letter,” a 2006
exchange of open letters related concerns about an alleged lack of accountability
in pooled donor support channeled through block grants under the Protection
of Basic Services (PBS) program, which includes the education sector.
10. http://www.mofed.gov.et/English/Pages/Home.aspx.
11. From approximately 17 percent of the recurrent budget on general education
in 2001/02, nonsalary spending fell to an average of 8 percent in
2007/08.
12. This favoritism is related in most cases to the influence of the ruling party. In
this regard, as previously reported in this chapter, party control of woredas