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142 Diagnosing Corruption in Ethiopia
those in many developing countries. Several priorities have a bearing on
corruption risk:
• Regional inventories of infrastructure, though implemented, do not
link schemes to financing modalities, making attribution impossible to
verify except through field visits (World Bank 2009).
• Monitoring output data—what is being built where—is inadequate,
making it difficult to know whether spending is cost-effective and
whether (and where) money might be leaking. Better tracking of funds
as they move along the transfer system toward water projects would
reduce the risk of corruption and improve planning.
• Monitoring and information systems for assessing access to water supply
and sanitation facilities were viewed as problematic, though
improving. 15
Many interviewees reported problems with “coverage inflation,” or
“information corruption,” as one person put it. Coverage figures are routinely
inflated as they pass upward from woredas to the regional and
federal levels, with politicians eager to show progress against targets. 16
Whether this practice fosters real corruption is a moot point. Given that
coverage inflation could lead to reduced funding under the block grant
formula, the answer would appear to be “no,” although the perception of
corruption remains.
Design, Tendering, and Procurement
Procurement requires public-private interaction for the purchase of a
wide range of goods and services, including borehole drilling and materials.
For this reason, it is one of the most well-publicized and well-documented
faces of corruption in the water sector (Plummer and Cross
2007). Depending on country context and project area, a number of
public actors may be involved, from national to local. Private actors may
include suppliers, contractors, operators, or local and national consultants.
Corruption may influence the selection of contracts for services and supplies,
payment schedules, profit margins, and the outcomes of the regulatory
process (Plummer and Cross 2007).
In Ethiopia, the drilling sector is characterized by a mix of private
operators, both national and international, and SOEs. Procurement can be
carried out by government institutions (typically regional bureaus) or
directly by donors and NGOs; the method depends on both financing
modalities and whether the commissioning agent has in-house drilling
capacity.