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406 Diagnosing Corruption in Ethiopia • Officials demand or accept bribes to set low compensation and impose lessonerous social conditions. ° Residents who are unwilling to move may have the site compulsorily purchased from them. However, the compensation from the mining company may be significantly below market value (particularly if the company has bribed the relevant official to approve a price that is below market value). • Local inhabitants disrupt mine operations to extract more compensation. ° Local inhabitants may block the road to the mine, preventing the minerals from being exported, and continue to do this until the mining company pays them additional compensation. • Local inhabitants wrongly claim that they occupy the land in order to claim compensation. ° When local inhabitants hear that an area is to be mined, they may immediately plant crops on the land to claim compensation. It may be difficult for the mining company to prove that the land was previously unoccupied. • Local inhabitants steal the mining company’s property. • Local gangs extort money by threatening personal injury or damage to property. • Corruption may occur in relation to the social conditions imposed on the mining company that are designed to benefit or protect the local community. ° In some cases, the mining company will need to lease some land outside the license area (for example, for mine buildings). Where there are several possible sites, an official may ensure that a site is chosen that is owned by him or his family or where his own community may benefit from the exploration or development (such as by the building of roads or schools or by the provision of jobs). ° The manager responsible for providing facilities to the community (for example, free health care) may corruptly require the community to pay him for the use of these services even though they are meant to be provided free of charge. ° The mining company may not provide the service or may provide a subquality service and then bribe the relevant inspector to overlook the breach. Alternatively, the inspector may have insufficient expertise or time to detect the breach. ° The mining company may deliberately breach the license requirements not to damage the surrounding area during mining operations and therefore may damage the local inhabitants’ agricultural or grazing
Corruption in the Mining Sector: Preliminary Overview 407 ground. The breach may never be spotted for lack of effective inspection, or the mining company may bribe an inspector to ensure that the breach is overlooked. Existing procedures for compensation and obligations to local inhabitants Because a wide variety of federal, regional, city, and local administrations control compensation and social conditions, no analysis was undertaken of the control mechanisms in place. MOM does not itself have powers to ensure enforcement of compensation requirements. The interviews and workshop revealed the following perceptions: • Most of the interviewees were not aware of any corruption in relation to local inhabitants, but they believed that this was a risk. • Some interviewees were aware of corruption in this area, including ° local inhabitants planting land once they had heard of a possible license to get additional compensation; and ° compensation being stolen by officials. The survey revealed the following perceptions: • Out of the 16 people who completed this section of the survey, four (25 percent) were aware of bribery or fraud in relation to local inhabitants. • One was aware of bribery or fraud from an organization’s experience, and four from rumor. • One believed that such bribery or fraud took place at the federal level, four at the regional level, and two at the city level. Risk rating: Medium The actual risk in Ethiopia of corruption in relation to compensation and obligations to local inhabitants at the federal license level is considered to be medium. Recommendations to mitigate risks • Clear procedures should be in place so that mining companies and local inhabitants know in advance the companies’ obligations in relation to compensation and social requirements and so that the discretion of all relevant officials is reduced. • The mining company should be required to publish—both on the Internet and at a local office—details of the social conditions with which it must comply and the compensation it has agreed to pay. Any local inhabitant can then see what he or she should receive.
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DIRECTIONS IN DEVELOPMENT Public Se
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Diagnosing Corruption in Ethiopia P
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Contents Foreword Preface About the
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Contents vii Chapter 6 Construction
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Contents ix Map 3.1 Ethiopian Regio
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Contents xi 3.6 Summary of Corrupti
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Foreword The government of the Fede
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Preface Although many would argue t
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Preface xvii Goldie-Scot, Piers Cro
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xx About the Editor and Authors bil
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xxii About the Editor and Authors g
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xxiv Abbreviations GAC Governance a
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CHAPTER 1 Overview Janelle Plummer
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Overview 3 Focusing on Ethiopia, th
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Overview 5 for their knowledge of c
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Overview 7 and group discussion wit
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Overview 9 analysis, Goldie-Scot ge
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Overview 11 Chapter 8: Telecommunic
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Overview 13 might be explained by t
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Overview 15 The perceptions of corr
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Overview 17 Given the Ethiopian gov
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20 Diagnosing Corruption in Ethiopi
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44 Figure 2.4 Corruption Vulnerabil
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154 Table 4.4 Value chain area Cons
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Annex 4.1 Ethiopian RWS Borehole St
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CHAPTER 5 Justice Sector Corruption
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Justice Sector Corruption in Ethiop
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Table 5.2 Disposition of Civil and
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CHAPTER 6 Construction Sector Corru
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Construction Sector Corruption in E
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Table 6.7 Overview of Perceived Cor
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Figure 6.5 Drivers of Corruption Ri
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292 Table 7.1 Upstream Value Chain
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