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162 Diagnosing Corruption in Ethiopia
policy shifts toward cost recovery and user financing raise the stakes:
under cost-sharing arrangements, the poor are paying for leakages caused
by corruption throughout the system in the form of higher (absolute)
contribution levels and higher bribes to secure (more costly) access to
water (Plummer 2007).
In Ethiopia, the principle of community-based management of rural
water supplies is now firmly entrenched. Under the UAP, communities
are viewed as active development partners in service delivery rather than
passive recipients of government aid. In this context, communities are
now expected to manage and maintain their own water systems following
initial support from the government, taking responsibility for collecting
and managing fees. This shift raises questions about how well local contribution
systems work—and, specifically, around corruption risk.
The survey team therefore asked community members questions
about payment and contribution systems for the maintenance of water
points, focusing on contribution levels, procedures, and outcomes. In
addition, other stakeholders in regional bureaus, NGOs, and donor agencies
were canvassed. In summary, the survey team found the following:
• In all of the villages surveyed, water and sanitation committees had
been established. However, the quality of the mobilization and management
process differed markedly. Only in those projects funded by
the World Bank WASH program or implemented by NGOs were
expressions of demand for improved supplies actively sought by projectimplementing
agencies in the form of up-front contributions to capital
costs, the opening of a bank account, and the formation of committees
prior to borehole construction.
• In those villages where the development process was rated highly
(WASH program and NGO), contribution systems appeared to be
much more robust and rules-based. That said, none of the users interviewed
during the course of the survey voiced concerns about the
embezzlement of fees (typically amounting to Br 1 to Br 2 per month
per household) by those responsible for collection, banking, and spending.
In each village, contributions were collected and periodically
banked.
• In contrast, interviews conducted with those outside the community
identified embezzlement of funds and “interference” in user group formation
as serious issues. Examples of corrupt practices cited included