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Complete Book PDF (4.12MB) - World Bank eLibrary

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Justice Sector Corruption in Ethiopia 189<br />

holds a monopoly or quasi-monopoly on its basic functions; (b) requires<br />

a large measure of discretionary decision making; and (c) faces practical<br />

and ideological constraints on the use of accountability mechanisms.<br />

These same factors also make it difficult to identify corruption conclusively,<br />

and they posed certain obstacles to this research—which, in the<br />

end, had to rely on the observations and perceptions of “knowledgeable”<br />

individuals and their willingness to divulge their own experience or what<br />

they believed was going on around them. To illustrate this comment, we<br />

can place Klitgaard’s three factors in the context of any justice sector’s<br />

operations.<br />

Monopoly. Although alternative forums have been proliferating for civil<br />

disputes (hence the popularity of alternative dispute resolution [Williams<br />

2002]), they cannot help to strengthen the legal framework because their<br />

decisions are individualized and private. The advantage of the official<br />

forums (be they state or traditional) is that they leave a public (if unwritten)<br />

record whereby individuals can calculate their risks should they or<br />

others decide to ignore the rules. In criminal cases, a monopolistic system<br />

is more important because the state (or the local community) will have<br />

more interest in ensuring that the rule-based and public decisions constitute<br />

a disincentive to rule violation.<br />

Discretion. Despite occasional efforts to reduce the discretionary powers<br />

of sector actors by establishing bright-line rules to guide their actions,<br />

there are practical limits to the feasibility of this approach. When<br />

pushed to extremes, it quickly leads to gridlock and its own injustices.<br />

Judicial reactions to sentencing rules in the United States are one example.<br />

Both judges and the public want greater flexibility and individualization<br />

of sentencing rather than conformity to an ironclad set of<br />

regulations.<br />

However, even when rules are introduced, they are difficult to enforce<br />

because so many of the sector actors operate in relative isolation:<br />

• The police officer confronted with a possible crime and suspect must and<br />

will make a context-based decision as to whether to ignore the possible<br />

offense or arrest the likely perpetrator. Corruption can enter here, of<br />

course, but there are other reasons for “letting the offender off”: a firsttime<br />

minor offense, more important matters to pursue, and so on.<br />

• Prosecutors must decide how much evidence is required to go forward<br />

with a case, whether they have a chance of collecting that evidence,

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