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Complete Book PDF (4.12MB) - World Bank eLibrary

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356 Diagnosing Corruption in Ethiopia<br />

The ETC’s Internal Safeguards against Corruption<br />

There are two aspects to the ETC’s control of corruption in Ethiopia’s<br />

telecoms sector: (a) its de jure controls, which describe the theoretical<br />

procedures and regulations, and (b) the de facto implementation of those<br />

controls. These are examined in turn below, broken down into the seven<br />

areas of risk previously identified in table 8.1. Some project management<br />

provisions cut across more than one of these risk areas. These are<br />

described in box 8.2.<br />

Table 8.1<br />

Corruption Risks in Ethiopia’s Telecommunications Sector<br />

Risk Area 1: Issuance of Operating Licenses<br />

International experience<br />

Typical international risk: Very high<br />

Internationally, this is one of the areas where the risk of corruption is greatest because the<br />

receipt of such licenses can lead to lucrative long-term revenues for network operators.<br />

Typical areas of such risk include the following:<br />

1a. Misappropriation of license fee by senior government officers or license-issuing officials<br />

The fee paid by the network operator may not be properly accounted for by the recipient body.<br />

Instead, it may be diverted into personal or party accounts, with or without the<br />

knowledge of the operator.<br />

1b. Bribery of senior government officers or officials to issue license<br />

A network operator may agree to give a government official’s relative a free share in the<br />

telecoms project if it is granted a license on beneficial terms to the network operator;<br />

an official may refuse to grant a license, or may delay the granting of a license, unless the<br />

network operator pays him a bribe or facilitation payment. 19<br />

1c. Senior government officers or officials issuing licenses to companies or joint ventures in<br />

which they or their family have a commercial interest<br />

A government official may require the network operator to make a large donation to a<br />

charity. Although the charity may appear to be genuine, it may in fact be a front for a political<br />

party or for the official’s personal or family gain.<br />

When large sums are involved in such corruption, it generally entails a conspiracy orchestrated<br />

by senior government or party officials rather than by junior public officials seeking<br />

personal advantage.<br />

In Ethiopia<br />

Current risk in Ethiopia: None<br />

The ETC, as a state-owned enterprise, has been awarded the exclusive license by the government<br />

to be the network operator in Ethiopia. There is, therefore, currently no conventional<br />

corruption risk specific to the actual license award process, though a lack of transparency is<br />

noted over the accountability mechanisms, if any, associated with that license.<br />

1a, 1b, 1c. The government has, over the years, prepared for the possible eventual partial privatization<br />

of the ETC. If and when this occurs, and licenses are issued to private sector operators, this<br />

is likely to become a very high risk area, in each of the three typical risk areas identified above.<br />

(continued next page)

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