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Complete Book PDF (4.12MB) - World Bank eLibrary

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Justice Sector Corruption in Ethiopia 195<br />

Table 5.1<br />

Passage of laws shaping<br />

sector operations<br />

Development, passage<br />

of sector budgets<br />

Human resource<br />

management<br />

Three Value Chains for Justice Sector Corruption Risk<br />

a. System Organization<br />

Potential forms of corruption<br />

• Political actors collude to ensure that rules increase their control<br />

over personnel decisions and influence other internal<br />

operations.<br />

• Political actors collude to increase their immunity from legal actions.<br />

• “Entrusted” actors bribe or offer other considerations to<br />

lawmakers to enhance their own positions and powers.<br />

• Private actors or citizens offer bribes or other considerations to<br />

executive and legislative officials to secure the most favorable<br />

legal framework for their own operations.<br />

• Political and governmental actors include earmarks for<br />

unnecessary services and facilities for their own benefit or that<br />

of protégés.<br />

• Potential providers of goods and services offer bribes or other<br />

considerations to executive and legislative officials to insert<br />

earmarks.<br />

• Political or governmental actors engage in trade-offs or favoritism<br />

to locate service units to favor certain groups.<br />

• Political authorities set salaries for classes of actors (or even<br />

individuals) based on favoritism, political trade-offs.<br />

• “Entrusted” actors reduce the merit component in selection of<br />

judges, prosecutors, defenders, police, and their own staffs<br />

through politically directed selection based on nepotism,<br />

political contacts, or the selection group’s desire to create their<br />

own internal networks (e.g., Venezuela, RB’s tribus legales).<br />

• Potential candidates for positions as judges, prosecutors,<br />

defenders, police, their staffs, and private entrusted actors use<br />

bribes, exchanges of favors, or networks of influence to shape<br />

the selection system.<br />

• Political and governmental actors assign personnel to positions and<br />

direct promotions based on favoritism and political contacts or,<br />

influenced by employees, based on bribes or promises of future<br />

favors.<br />

• External (nongovernmental) patrons buy or otherwise influence<br />

decisions regarding assignment of personnel.<br />

• Political actors use the disciplinary system to punish those<br />

(including private entrusted actors) who resist pressures and<br />

bribes and to reward those who acquiesce.<br />

• External (nongovernmental) patrons buy or otherwise influence<br />

disciplinary decisions.<br />

• Public actors who oversee private bar performance and licensing<br />

of these and other officers of the court accept or solicit bribes or<br />

succumb to favoritism in making their decisions.<br />

(continued next page)

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