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Complete Book PDF (4.12MB) - World Bank eLibrary

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Justice Sector Corruption in Ethiopia 231<br />

5. Some sources (Mariam 2002) trace the origins of the social courts to far<br />

earlier practices. Currently, these government-appointed bodies operate at<br />

the level of the kebele (the lowest administrative unit). They are composed<br />

of lay members who are supposed to operate based on a combination of<br />

local values and formal law, although for the most part they have little<br />

training in the latter (Mariam 2002; NJI 2008). Despite many criticisms of<br />

their operations (including corruption linked to favoritism and political<br />

influences), it seems unlikely that they can be eliminated quickly (NJI<br />

2008, 183–84) and thus the current strategy seems to be to restrict their<br />

jurisdiction (removing some highly controversial areas including land) and<br />

train their members.<br />

6. Accurate figures were elusive, but the authorities interviewed guessed that<br />

police staffing is currently under 60,000 (with 70,000 as a new goal)—<br />

providing a police-population ratio of about 75 to 100,000. Such a ratio is<br />

possibly usual for Africa (figures are unattainable elsewhere as well) but far<br />

below the standard recommendation of 300 police per 100,000 of population.<br />

However, the 60,000 total figure seems low, especially because the<br />

Federal Police (which provided it) claims to have a 30,000 staffing level and<br />

because other sources note that the Amhara region has another 15,000<br />

(Bourassa 2009).<br />

7. The extreme cases are nations where corrupt institutions have become<br />

predatory in their relations with citizens or have been fully captured by elites<br />

for the principal purpose of eliminating opposition.<br />

8. Frequent risk reduction tactics including hiring private security, inflating costs<br />

(to compensate for the difficulty of collecting payments), and relying exclusively<br />

on known suppliers and contractors (see <strong>World</strong> <strong>Bank</strong> 2009 for comments<br />

on the latter practice in Ethiopia). The authors do not cite corruption<br />

but rather delays and inefficiency as the motivating factors.<br />

9. As Zook (2009) and others have noted, Singapore’s reputed success depends<br />

on factors not common to less-developed countries: sufficient resources to<br />

establish a complex internal mentoring system (and to pay extremely high<br />

salaries) and the country’s small size. If this is, as some writers hold, “the Asian<br />

model,” its application in countries such as China has proved a far less successful<br />

check on corruption, especially at the local level.<br />

10. The prosecutors have also tried to argue that provisionally closed cases should<br />

not be counted, but unfortunately this is the international practice. If not<br />

counted, their conviction rates would be in the 80 percent range, according to<br />

Ministry of Justice interviews.<br />

11. “Minor” is a relative term, and as Bourassa (2009) notes, in some regions,<br />

cases with up to 15 years’ imprisonment as a penalty are handled in these<br />

courts.

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