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145<br />

Table 4.3<br />

Value chain area<br />

Contract design<br />

Tendering and<br />

procurement<br />

Corruption Risk in Contract Design, Tendering, and Procurement in the Ethiopian Rural Water Supply Sector<br />

Typical corrupt practices in<br />

water delivery chain<br />

• Influence on project-level decision making<br />

• Bribery for preferential treatment, elite capture<br />

• Distortionary decision making<br />

• Administrative corruption (fraud, falsification of<br />

documents, silence payments)<br />

• Interdepartment or interagency collusion over<br />

procurement and construction<br />

• Bribery to influence contract or bid organization<br />

• Corruption in delegating management: fraud to<br />

over- or underestimate assets; selection, type,<br />

and award of concessions; decisions over duration,<br />

exclusivity, tariffs, subsidies<br />

• Corruption in procurement: inflated estimates for<br />

capital works, supply of chemicals, vehicles,<br />

equipment<br />

• Falsification of documents<br />

Source: Author.<br />

Note: RWS = rural water supply. ST = study team finding. WS = workshop finding.<br />

Risk areas evaluated by study team<br />

in Ethiopia (RWS) Risk ST Risk WS<br />

• Program and contract design: favoring one particular<br />

contractor over another for corrupt reasons (e.g., by<br />

specifying one supplier’s equipment or one<br />

contractor’s rig)<br />

• Contract design: evidence of overengineering in<br />

design specification to generate more work for<br />

contractors or suppliers<br />

• Tendering process: fully competitive tendering of<br />

contracts or unexplained or unwarranted exceptions<br />

• Prequalification process: e.g., inconsistencies that<br />

favor a particular contractor or group of contractors<br />

• Collusion in bids: e.g., decisions around which drilling<br />

companies compete for certain contracts, with<br />

payments offered or solicited<br />

• Objectivity and transparency of the tender<br />

assessment process: e.g., can the process favor the<br />

wrong contractor for corrupt reasons?<br />

• Contract award: potential for extortion by<br />

government officials from contractors (e.g., winning<br />

contractor asked to pay bribe to guarantee award)<br />

Risk<br />

Low<br />

High

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