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Complete Book PDF (4.12MB) - World Bank eLibrary

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358 Diagnosing Corruption in Ethiopia<br />

Table 8.1<br />

(continued)<br />

Risk Area 3: Appointment of Equipment Suppliers<br />

International experience<br />

Typical international risk: High<br />

3b. Bribery by the supplier of the network operator’s employees or of senior government officials<br />

(i) to award the contract to the supplier;<br />

An international supplier appoints a local agent who is paid a percentage of the sale price if<br />

the contract is won. The agent then approaches a senior official of the network operator, or a<br />

government minister, and offers a share of the commission if the supplier is awarded the contract.<br />

The tender procedures or result is manipulated accordingly.<br />

(ii) to agree on an inflated price;<br />

The international supplier enters into a subcontract with a local contractor. The subcontract<br />

price is significantly higher than the value of the work involved. The local contractor offers a<br />

bribe to an official or minister on the basis that, if the international supplier wins the order, the<br />

local contractor will receive a subcontract and pay the bribe out of the surplus in its subcontract<br />

price.<br />

(iii) to agree on supply of excess, unnecessary, unsuitable, or defective equipment;<br />

(iv) to replace working equipment with new equipment;<br />

(v) to award contracts without proper equipment specification and pricing;<br />

(vi) to award numerous contracts to one supplier with no commercial justification; and<br />

(vii) to bypass requirements of tender.<br />

3c. Wrongful elimination of tenderers by network operator’s employees to fix the contract<br />

award<br />

3d. Failure by network operator to debar poorly performing suppliers<br />

3e. Appointment by network operator’s employees of suppliers in whom they or senior<br />

government or party officials or financial supporters have a commercial interest.<br />

In Ethiopia<br />

Current risk in Ethiopia: Very high<br />

3a, 3b, 3c, 3d, 3e. This is the highest area of perceived risk in Ethiopia, with reports of all five<br />

of the typical risks listed above. In particular, procurement procedures are understood at<br />

times to be manipulated or bypassed along the lines currently being investigated by the<br />

FEACC. Many former ETC officials are currently facing corruption charges.<br />

The risk is especially high in Ethiopia because of the extraordinarily high costs of supplies<br />

involved, which means that significant corrupt gains can potentially be made on the<br />

basis of relatively few transactions. In addition, the bulk of telecoms equipment is supplied<br />

by major international companies that have the financial capability to offer large bribes<br />

and to pay these bribes outside the country, thereby making illicit payments difficult to<br />

trace. This potential for major incentives increases the possibility of intervention by senior<br />

government officials who may request that procurement procedures and anticorruption<br />

safeguards be bypassed.<br />

Particular concerns are expressed in media reports, expert interviews, and in study workshops<br />

about a US$1.5 billion vendor financing contract that appears to have been placed without<br />

competitive tender and in breach of the ETC’s own procurement procedures. By comparison with<br />

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