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Moral Compliance and the ConcealedCharm of Prudenceby Jan TullbergAbstract:The article discusses morality from the perspective of compliance.The expectation that rules easily will be internalized and thenfollowed makes very unrealistic assumptions about human behavior.There are good reasons to put more trust in prudence - amoralitysupported by incentives - than pure morality. There are reasons to becritical to morals that have no prospect to be developed intoprudence. Such a preference for a prudent morality is also a criterionfor selection among different suggestions of moral rules.A normative suggestion in the Prisoner' s Dilemma exemplifies thecase of prudent morality. The player should play contribute if theexpected value of that choice exceeds his payoff of mutua! defection.This suggestion is in line with Gauthier's rules for constrainedmaximizers. Empirical evidence indicates strong preferences forsymmetric outcomes: People tend to contribute rather than defect ifthe other player also is expected to contribute; otherwise mutualdefection is the preferred outcome. Fruitful revisions of the game aremore likely to be found in modifying the payoffs of playing defectionthan in seeing the players' priority of their personal payoff as themain obstacle for cooperation.The article questions the value of an absolute morality and suggests amorality that is more of a prudent policy than a categoricalimperative. A conviction of a good average result in the long run isthe most relevant argument for complying with a rule.III : 1

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