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generally discernable from integrist and reciprocals, subjectsshowing high integrist scores often had high reciprocal scores. Aneffort was therefore made to improve the means for separatingreciprocals and integrists. For the last third of test persons, theinquiry was expanded with 10 additional questiollS directed atdistinguishing differences between integrists and reciproeals. Byincluding these 10 new questions the number of signifieantcorrelations increased to 55, although 10 were against the model.Finally, a short list of 15 questions was selected that had been run onthe whole test group and proven to give the most salient results. Thislistis provided and suggested to be used in future classifieations oftest persons into the three ethical groups.The experimentThe experimental part of this research consisted of three games:1/ An Ultimatum game with an anonymous co-player2/ A Dictator game with an anonymous co-player3/ An Ultimatum game with face to face negotiation possibilitieswith a co-playerIn an ultimatum game one player, the proposer, suggests a split of anamount (100 sek in this experiment) between himself and the otherplayer, the responder. If the offer is equal or higher than theresponder's demand the 'ultimatum' is considered aceepted and theplayers are payed accordingly. If the offer is lower, the ultimatum isconsidered rejeeted and the two players get no money.An important step prior to this experiment was an analysis I made ofan experiment by Carter and Irons (1991). The amount the proposerwanted to hold for himself, the P-value, was much lower than thatstipulated by game theory, but rationai given the demands ofresponders (the R:-value). It is rationai to have a buffer - a safetymargin between the amount in the game not to be surpassed and thesum of the R- and P-value. The theory and empirical evidence forsuch a proposer behavior is strong enough to consider it rationai ­even if in confliet with game theory.The Responder behavior is still a problem, however. Why anyone,though more specifically whieh type of person, would ask for a lotmore than the minimum amount when this request will not contributeIV: 6

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