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to their reward, but increase the risk of getting nothing at all?ResultsOne result associated with game 1, and in line with the hypothesis,was that reciprocal individuals were demanding significantly more asrepanders than the other two ethical groups.The giving in the Dictator game was unusually limited, also in thealtruist group, when compared with games conducted by otherresearchers. A more intuitive expectation, given the context of thisexperiment - the game following an ethieal test and an ultimatllmgame - would be an influence for giving agreater amount. Thedifferences in P-value between the three groups were not signifieant.In the negotiation game it was expected that the buffer should godown and so it did. The integrists kept a rather high buffer (9 SEKeompared to 3 and 2 for the reciprocals and the altruists,respectively), a behavior in line with the model. One hypothesis wasthat the proposer should get the major part of the eut in the buffer.However, not only did the responder get all of the buffer, bllt he alsogot the proposer to eut down on his P-value. The result of this gamewas a more equivalent split between proposer and responder for allthree groups.Values and behaviorRespondents were asked to make normative statements anddeseriptive estimates of the ultimatum game. In deeiding P-value ingame 1 (PI), it seems rationai for the proposer to take his descriptiveestimate of the other player into account. So the correlation shownhere was no surprise. For the decision on R-value (R!), there is norationale for such a connection, but the expectation was a strongcorrelation to the normative position (RN). Surprisingly the R-valuewas more strongly correlated to the descriptive (RD) than to thenormative (R! - RD was 0.77, and RI- RN was 0.40).The same descriptive link appeared in the Dietator game. p2 wasmore highly correlated to RD than to RN. These results give aninteresting, if disappointing, indieation that behavior is more eloselytied, or assoeiated, with the behavior of others, even when thereexists an excellent possibility to follow one's own judgement.IV: 7