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Frank (1988) presents an experiment of the Prisoner's Dilemma inwhich the test persons were asked about their expectations of theother person's behavior. Ofthose that thought the other person wouldcontribute, 83 per cent decided to contribute. The share of contributeamong persons that thought that the other person would notcontribute was only 15 per cent. The same pattern has been shown inwork such as Dawes et al. (1977). This experiment also shows thatone explanation for this difference is that the expectations partly arerationalizations of a chosen decision. Such a behavior indicates anormative support for a symmetric outcome. People do not want tobe a sucker/saint and they don't want to be a free-rider - they want tobe cooperative if there is a good possibility for success, and a noncooperatorwhen the other person will not contribute. To get asymmetric result, they adjust their own behavior and also theirexpectations of the other players' behavior.I think Thomas Hobbes would have supported this rule of reciprocalmorality for the Prisoner's Dilemma, but his nemesis in Leviathan ­the Foole - would certainly object. The Foole supported the idea thatit is rationai to make agreements in situations like this game, but thatit is another matter if one should honor such an agreement.Supporting the game theorists, he would point out that one square inthe matrix is excluded in the suggested calculation. If the players geta chance to talk before the game - as they do in some variations - thisis normally classified as "cheap talk". Of course people say they willcontribute, blIt rationai people will discard such promises and ifdealing with other rationaI persons, a rationai person will waste littletime talking or listening to such cheap talk. Being more practicallyoriented than the game theorist, the Foole will not think his listenersare all rationai persons. Even if he does not have the best ofreputation, he might get a significant improvement by fooling someof the people some of the time. Fifteen per cent suckers/saints changethe expected value of the defect alternative significantly: 0.85 x 2 +0.15 x 4 =2.3. Non-cooperation is not the only outcome of playingdefect. In similar manner as the reciprocal agent burdens thecontribute alternative with the risks of defection from the co-player,the Foole sweetens the defect alternative with own free-riding inaddition to the non-cooperative outcome. Why not? This questionpinpoints the crucial difference between a reciprocal morality andstraight maximization. From a practical point of view, a lot can besaid for non-cooperation. Moral judgements will distinguish betweenIII: 7