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take a common example in the discussion of morality: the Prisoner'sDilemma. As mentioned I will take a position in the normativequestion how one should behave in such a situation. The reasaningwill be illustrated with calculations from the following matrix:Figure 2Person BcontributedefectPerson AContributeDefect3;3 -1; 4(Cooperation) ~A is a Sucker/Saint4; -1 2;2(A is free-riding) (Non-Cooperation)Most often the two choices of action are called 'defect' and,cooperate', but I think that the latter term should be used for aspecific outcome. It takes two to tango. and the action should be seenas a contribution that might result in a cooperation but not necessarilyso.The game theoretical judgment is that a rationai person shouldalways chose to defect since that gives the best result regardless ofthe other person's choice of action (if A chooses to defect he will get4 instead of 3, or 2 instead of -1 depending upon B's choice).Therefore the players end up in the Non-Cooperation outcome of (2;2). If one player deviates from and chooses to contribute he will getan impairment to -1. Non-Cooperation becomes a Nash equilibrium;implying that none of the players will change his strategy. This isremarkable since both players are better off in the Cooperationsolution (3;3), (Non-Cooperation is Pareto dominated byCooperatian). A problematic situation is illustrated when rationalityand efficiency promote two different alternatives. Many gametheorists (e.g. Binmore 1998) insist that the Nash equilibrium is thesolution and when people behave differently this is caused byIII : 5