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Challenges in the Era of Globalization - iaabd

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Proceed<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 12th Annual Conference © 2011 IAABD<br />

Four ma<strong>in</strong> transmission mechanisms <strong>of</strong> economic and f<strong>in</strong>ancial crises from <strong>the</strong> developed economies to<br />

<strong>the</strong> develop<strong>in</strong>g ones have been identified <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> literature. These are <strong>the</strong> trade channel, capital market<br />

channel, foreign aid channel and remittances (Balaskrishman et al 2009, frank and Hesse 2009, Roe 2009,<br />

Odi 2009 and Gosh et al 2009). Although many extant studies have confirmed <strong>the</strong> transmission <strong>of</strong><br />

f<strong>in</strong>ancial crisis and f<strong>in</strong>ancial stress to develop<strong>in</strong>g countries and some have identified <strong>the</strong> channels <strong>of</strong><br />

transmission, none to <strong>the</strong> best <strong>of</strong> our knowledge has exam<strong>in</strong>e exam<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> mechanism from developed<br />

countries to Nigeria. To fill this lacuna, this paper exam<strong>in</strong>es <strong>the</strong> impact <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> global crisis on <strong>the</strong> Nigerian<br />

capital market.<br />

The paper is <strong>in</strong> five sections. Follow<strong>in</strong>g this <strong>in</strong>troductory section, <strong>the</strong> second section reviews <strong>the</strong> extant<br />

literature on <strong>the</strong> subject matter. In <strong>the</strong> third section, we present <strong>the</strong> methodology while <strong>the</strong> fourth section<br />

discusses <strong>the</strong> results <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> exercise <strong>in</strong> section three. The fifth summarizes <strong>the</strong> f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs and draws some<br />

conclusions, while mak<strong>in</strong>g recommendations to help policy makers.<br />

Rreview <strong>of</strong> extant <strong>the</strong>oretical and empirical studies<br />

The reasons for and effects <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> current global economic and f<strong>in</strong>ancial crisis have been well documented<br />

<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> literature. The crisis, which has its genesis <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> U.S Subprime mortgages crisis <strong>in</strong> August 2007,<br />

rapidly escalated and spilled over to f<strong>in</strong>ancial markets and economies all over <strong>the</strong> world. Greenlaw et al.<br />

(2008), Blanchard (2009) and Brunnermeier (2009), moreover, trace <strong>the</strong> roots <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ancial crisis to <strong>the</strong><br />

preced<strong>in</strong>g seven years <strong>of</strong> high global growth, low <strong>in</strong>terest rates and limited volatility. The underestimation<br />

<strong>of</strong> risks and over-optimism about <strong>the</strong> future, as a result <strong>of</strong> high growth/low volatility and low <strong>in</strong>terest<br />

rates, led to <strong>the</strong> creation and <strong>the</strong> purchase <strong>of</strong> riskier assets and ultimately asset price bubble. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to<br />

Nadauld and Sherlund (2008) <strong>the</strong> bubble reached its peak <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> U.S <strong>in</strong> 2006 and house prices <strong>the</strong>re and<br />

elsewhere started to fall. The fall <strong>in</strong> house prices led to a fall <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> prices <strong>of</strong> securitized subprime<br />

mortgages, affect<strong>in</strong>g f<strong>in</strong>ancial markets worldwide. The demise <strong>of</strong> Lehman Bro<strong>the</strong>rs <strong>in</strong> September 2008<br />

forced markets to re-assess risk and this eventually led to massive <strong>in</strong>vestors’ withdrawal <strong>of</strong> funds from <strong>the</strong><br />

markets. This market illiquidity <strong>in</strong> turn resulted <strong>in</strong> massive decl<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong> economic activity <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> U.S. and<br />

many o<strong>the</strong>r countries. In general, risk concentrations, market <strong>in</strong>discipl<strong>in</strong>e and lax f<strong>in</strong>ancial regulation and<br />

supervision, among o<strong>the</strong>rs, contributed <strong>in</strong> no small way to <strong>the</strong> crisis (Blanchard 2009).<br />

Indeed, f<strong>in</strong>ancial crises, characterized as currency crises and bank<strong>in</strong>g crises, have long been studied.<br />

Krugman (1979) shows that currency crises occurs when deterioration <strong>in</strong> economic fundamentals leads to<br />

a crisis <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> external account while Obstfeld (1986) <strong>in</strong>dicates that a “second-generation” model <strong>of</strong><br />

currency crises exists and occurs even <strong>in</strong> countries with sound fundamentals ow<strong>in</strong>g to self-fulfill<strong>in</strong>g<br />

expectations. In a world <strong>of</strong> “multiple equilibria,” countries with relatively sound fundamentals may end<br />

up with a bad equilibrium; that is, a currency crisis. Bank<strong>in</strong>g crises on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand are associated with a<br />

run on bank deposits and this can result from fundamental weaknesses <strong>of</strong> several commercial banks or<br />

from self-fulfill<strong>in</strong>g expectations (as modeled by Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). These “tw<strong>in</strong> crises”<br />

(currency and bank<strong>in</strong>g crises) tend to be associated with each o<strong>the</strong>r and <strong>of</strong>ten take place toge<strong>the</strong>r.<br />

Kam<strong>in</strong>sky and Re<strong>in</strong>hart (1999) show that currency crises can cause bank<strong>in</strong>g crises, bank<strong>in</strong>g crises can<br />

cause currency crises, and currency and bank<strong>in</strong>g crises can result from common factors. When an<br />

economic boom is f<strong>in</strong>anced by a surge both <strong>in</strong> large capital <strong>in</strong>flows and <strong>in</strong> bank credit, <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />

boom tends to be accompanied by both currency and bank<strong>in</strong>g crises (McK<strong>in</strong>non and Pill 1996). Before<br />

<strong>the</strong> episodes <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1990s, f<strong>in</strong>ancial crises were, <strong>in</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>ciple, considered as events occurr<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividual<br />

countries. But <strong>the</strong> Mexican crisis <strong>of</strong> 1994–95, <strong>the</strong> East Asian crisis <strong>of</strong> 1997–98, and <strong>the</strong> Russian crisis <strong>of</strong><br />

1998 had strong contagion (or spillover) effects <strong>in</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r countries; that is a crisis <strong>in</strong> one country was<br />

rapidly transmitted to <strong>the</strong> rest <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world.<br />

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