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Challenges in the Era of Globalization - iaabd

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<strong>Challenges</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Era</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Globalization</strong><br />

Edited by Emmanuel Obuah<br />

The pr<strong>of</strong>it hereis <strong>the</strong> operat<strong>in</strong>g pr<strong>of</strong>it due to more stable and last<strong>in</strong>g,<br />

which is <strong>the</strong> result <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> production or o<strong>the</strong>r bus<strong>in</strong>ess activities, while <strong>the</strong> net pr<strong>of</strong>it is <strong>in</strong>fluenced by<br />

many o<strong>the</strong>r uncerta<strong>in</strong>ty and uncontrollable factors.<br />

The formula embodies <strong>the</strong> assumption that an effective <strong>in</strong>ternal capital market will cont<strong>in</strong>ue to <strong>in</strong>vest <strong>the</strong><br />

<strong>in</strong>dustry where pr<strong>of</strong>its keeps grow<strong>in</strong>g, while reduce <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>vestment on <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>dustry where pr<strong>of</strong>it decl<strong>in</strong>es.<br />

In particular, if β greater than zero, it means when <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>dustry pr<strong>of</strong>it <strong>in</strong>crease, <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>vestment will be<br />

also <strong>in</strong>creased; and <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternal capital market is effective. On <strong>the</strong> contrary, if <strong>the</strong> variable is less than � �<br />

0, <strong>the</strong>n this market is an <strong>in</strong>efficient <strong>in</strong> resource allocation.<br />

Empirical design for <strong>the</strong> factors <strong>in</strong>fluenc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> efficiency <strong>of</strong> capital allocation<br />

The efficiency <strong>of</strong> central SOEs’ <strong>in</strong>vestment is <strong>in</strong>fluenced by problems <strong>of</strong> asymmetric <strong>in</strong>formation and<br />

agency. The problems have two primary levels: one is between <strong>the</strong> central SOE and <strong>the</strong>ir subunits; <strong>the</strong><br />

second one is between <strong>the</strong> central SOE and <strong>the</strong> central government represented by SASAC <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> State<br />

Council. We assume <strong>the</strong> agency conflicts with<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> firm can be solved or mitigated by 5 categories <strong>of</strong><br />

<strong>in</strong>fluenc<strong>in</strong>g factors as follows.<br />

One<br />

Firstly, <strong>the</strong> management motivation could improve <strong>the</strong> efficiency <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternal capital market. We use two<br />

<strong>in</strong>dicators to measure <strong>the</strong> degree <strong>of</strong> managers’ motivation. is management equity <strong>in</strong>centives<br />

denoted by <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>dicator variables Mshare, which takes on <strong>the</strong> value 1 if <strong>the</strong> company has equity <strong>in</strong>centive<br />

program and 0 if it has not. Management compensation, represented by <strong>in</strong>dicator variables M<strong>in</strong>come,<br />

which is <strong>the</strong> top3 executive's compensation. S<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> large range values <strong>of</strong> this variable, <strong>the</strong> empirical<br />

study would take <strong>the</strong> natural logarithm. � �<br />

Secondly, <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternal governance generally affects <strong>the</strong> efficiency <strong>of</strong> capital allocation. The companies<br />

with better corporate governance have more efficient <strong>in</strong>ternal capital markets and so higher corporate<br />

value. S<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> board <strong>of</strong> directors is seemed as <strong>the</strong> essence <strong>of</strong> corporate governance, we selected two<br />

<strong>in</strong>dicators reflect<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> board structure as our measures. One is <strong>the</strong> proportion <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependent directors<br />

(IDR). The o<strong>the</strong>r is whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> chairman and general manager is <strong>the</strong> same person (CM), which takes <strong>the</strong><br />

value <strong>of</strong> 1 if it is not <strong>the</strong> same person, and 0 if it is.<br />

The third factor category is <strong>the</strong> external governance, such as creditors’ supervision and government<br />

regulations etc. We <strong>in</strong>vestigate <strong>the</strong> function <strong>of</strong> external governance by one <strong>in</strong>dictor regard<strong>in</strong>g creditors,<br />

denoted by asset-liability ratio (Total liabilities / total assets). We assume with <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>of</strong> assetliability<br />

ratio, <strong>the</strong> creditors (banks or o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong>stitutions) will enhance <strong>the</strong> supervision on <strong>the</strong> enterprises’<br />

operation and <strong>in</strong>vestment for <strong>the</strong>ir own f<strong>in</strong>ancial safety.<br />

Next, <strong>the</strong> capital structure <strong>of</strong> central SOEs may have notable effect on <strong>the</strong> efficiency <strong>in</strong> capital allocation<br />

dur<strong>in</strong>g Ch<strong>in</strong>ese transition and SOEs’ reform. Two measures are used to reflect <strong>the</strong> capital structure.<br />

�Separation <strong>of</strong> control right and cash flow right (Sep) Share proportion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> largest shareholder or<br />

controll<strong>in</strong>g shareholder (LSshare). These two <strong>in</strong>dicators reflect <strong>the</strong> agency problem between controll<strong>in</strong>g<br />

shareholder and m<strong>in</strong>ority shareholders. The controll<strong>in</strong>g shareholders’ <strong>in</strong>terest exploitation from m<strong>in</strong>ority<br />

shareholders is due to <strong>the</strong> conflicts between cash-flow rights and vot<strong>in</strong>g rights. �<br />

The f<strong>in</strong>al type <strong>of</strong> factor is <strong>the</strong> unique characteristics <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> central SOEs, such as total assets, market<br />

value, net assets, etc. Those <strong>in</strong>dicators show <strong>the</strong> features <strong>of</strong> central SOE, which is <strong>the</strong> condition and<br />

environment <strong>of</strong> ICM and hence affect <strong>the</strong> efficiency <strong>of</strong> ICM. We choose book value <strong>of</strong> asset to present<br />

β<br />

755

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