Steven Pinker -- How the Mind Works - Hampshire High Italian ...

80 HOW THE MIND WORKSYou still might wonder how the marks being scribbled and erased bydemons inside the computer are supposed to represent or stand for thingsin the world. Who decides that this mark in the system corresponds tothat bit of the world? In the case of a computer, the answer is obvious:we get to decide what the symbols mean, because we built the machine.But who means the meaning of the symbols allegedly inside its'? Philosopherscall this the problem of "intentionality" (confusingly, because it hasnothing to do with intentions). There are two common answers. One isthat a symbol is connected to its referent in the world by our senseorgans. Your mother's face reflects light, which stimulates your eye,which triggers a cascade of templates or similar circuits, which inscribethe symbol mother in your mind. The other answer is that the uniquepattern of symbol manipulations triggered by the first symbol mirrors theunique pattern of relationships between the referent of the first symboland the referents of the triggered symbols. Once we agree, for whateverreason, to say that mother means mother, uncle means uncle, and so on,the new interlocking kinship statements generated by the demons turnout to be uncannily true, time and again. The device prints Bellamother-of Me, and sure enough, Bella is my mother. Mother means"mother" because it plays a role in inferences about mothers.These are called the "causal" and the "inferential-role" theories, andphilosophers hostile to each have had fun thinking up preposterousthought experiments to refute them. Oedipus didn't want to marry hismother, but he did so anyway. Why? Because his mother triggered thesymbol Jocasta in him rather than the symbol Mom, and his desire wascouched as "If it's Mom, don't marry her." The causal effects of Jocasta, thewoman who really was Oedipus' mother, were irrelevant; all that matteredwas the inferential role that the symbols Jocasta and Mom played insideOedipus' head. A lightning bolt hits a dead tree in the middle of a swamp,and by an amazing coincidence the slime coalesces into a molecule-formoleculereplica of me at this moment, memories included. Swampmanhas never been in contact with my mother, but most people w|ould saythat his mother thoughts are about my mother, just as mine are. Again weconclude that causation by something in the world is not necessary for asymbol to be about something; its inferential role is enough.But, but, but! Suppose the sequence of information-processing steps