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380 . ILLUSTRATED WORLD
it mathematically probable that at least
half the shots will strike home.
It is for this reason and also because
of the smoke nuisance which ensues
when guns are handled singly, that instantaneous
salvo firing has replaced individual
firing in all the navies of the
world. In order to secure this instant
precision, the "gun pointers" are required
to fire within one second after
the signal is given. This requires a great
deal of concentration and continual practice,
coupled wdth the most intimate and
thorough knowledge of the electrical
gears by which the guns are controlled.
When it is remembered that the pointers
operate the controlling levers of the
enormous 60-ton guns and of the turrets
weighing 500 tons each, making them
follow the peculiar and mystifying roll
of the ship, it will be seen that constant
training and exceptional skill are necessary.
In handling the big guns on a modern
dreadnaught the tendency is to keep the
control as concentrated as possible, so
as to minimize individual errors. The
introduction of the master sight is the
latest move to secure this concentrated
control, although, in case the master
sight mechanism is disabled by the
enemy's fire, the old-fashioned apparatus
for the individual sighting of each gun
would be called into play.
In salvo or broadside firing the theory
is that all guns should be discharged at
intervals of half a minute. The precise
determination of this time and the instant
for the firing of the next salvo depends
upon a single officer, wdth assistants to
take his place in case of his disability.
The gun pointers and the men in charge
of the master sight are responsible for
keeping their guns trained on the target,
but they are allowed no individual latitude
in the question of firing because this
would disrupt the entire salvo or simultaneous
system.
The entire scheme of modern naval
gun fire may therefore be said to hinge
upon the data supplied by the spotter and
the range-finder, transmitted to the men
in charge of the master-sights ; for, if the
guns are kept trained on the target, with
due allowances for the changing range,
the matter of firing upon a given signal
is purely mechanical and the operations
of the men who actually handle the big
guns are reduced to a minimum, a condition
wdiich is absolutely essential to
rapid, accurate and simultaneous salvos.
An interesting feature of salvo firing
and one which adds to the difficulty of
effective shooting is the result produced
by the recoil of the big guns, a 12-inch
broadside causing the largest dreadnaught
to roll through an arc of five
degrees, while the 14-inch guns produce
an even greater swing. This effect is
counterbalanced by firing the next salvo
while the ship rolls toward the target.
If a series of salvos were fired while the
ship was rolling away, the vessel would
be completely overturned by the cumulative
effect of the recoils. This rolling
motion, added to the natural swell of the
sea, or, in rough weather, to the waves,
makes it difficult for the men in charge
of the big guns to keep them always on
the target, but so expert have they become
that even the stormiest sea has but
little effect upon their efficiency.
In time of battle, the big guns would
at first be trained amidships on the
enemy's vessel, the theory of dispersal
being that some of the shots would land
in the superstructure—thus putting the
spotter's lookout and the fighting tops
out of commission—while others would
penetrate the magazines and the turrets
or seriously damage the ship below the
water line. After the first two or three
minutes of firing, however, it is probable
that the guns would be trained on whatever
portion of the enemy appeared to be
unharmed. After ten salvos, provided
our guns had not been disabled in the
meantime, the attacking ship ought to be
out of commission.
The range at which an American fleet
would open fire would depend in large
part upon the nature of the enemy's
squadron. In the case of battle cruisers,
which rely mainly on their speed for pro-