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30 THE NATURE OF INQUIRY<br />

their own status. Further, the link between<br />

ideology critique and emancipation is neither clear<br />

nor proven, nor a logical necessity (Morrison<br />

1995a: 67) – whether a person or society can<br />

become emancipated simply by the exercise<br />

of ideology critique or action research is an<br />

empirical rather than a logical matter (Morrison<br />

1995a; Wardekker and Miedama 1997). Indeed<br />

one can become emancipated by means other than<br />

ideology critique; emancipated societies do not<br />

necessarily demonstrate or require an awareness<br />

of ideology critique. Moreover, it could be argued<br />

that the rationalistic appeal of ideology critique<br />

actually obstructs action designed to bring about<br />

emancipation. Roderick (1986: 65), for example,<br />

questions whether the espousal of ideology critique<br />

is itself as ideological as the approaches that it<br />

proscribes. Habermas, in his allegiance to the view<br />

of the social construction of knowledge through<br />

‘interests’, is inviting the charge of relativism.<br />

While the claim to there being three forms of<br />

knowledge has the epistemological attraction of<br />

simplicity, one has to question this very simplicity<br />

(e.g. Keat 1981: 67); there are a multitude of<br />

interests and ways of understanding the world and<br />

it is simply artificial to reduce these to three.<br />

Indeed it is unclear whether Habermas, in his<br />

three knowledge-constitutive interests, is dealing<br />

with a conceptual model, a political analysis, a set<br />

of generalities, a set of transhistorical principles, a<br />

set of temporally specific observations, or a set of<br />

loosely defined slogans (Morrison 1995a: 71) that<br />

survive only by dint of their ambiguity (Kolakowsi<br />

1978). Lakomski (1999: 179–82) questions the<br />

acceptability of the consensus theory of truth on<br />

which Habermas’s work is premised; she argues<br />

that Habermas’s work is silent on social change,<br />

and is little more than speculation, a view echoed<br />

by Fendler’s (1999) criticism of critical theory<br />

as inadequately problematizing subjectivity and<br />

ahistoricity.<br />

More fundamental to a critique of this approach<br />

is the view that critical theory has a deliberate<br />

political agenda, and that the task of the researcher<br />

is not to be an ideologue or to have an<br />

agenda, but to be dispassionate, disinterested and<br />

objective (Morrison 1995a). Of course, critical<br />

theorists would argue that the call for researchers<br />

to be ideologically neutral is itself ideologically<br />

saturated with laissez-faire values which allow the<br />

status quo to be reproduced, i.e. that the call<br />

for researchers to be neutral and disinterested is<br />

just as value laden as is the call for them to<br />

intrude their own perspectives. The rights of the<br />

researcher to move beyond disinterestedness are<br />

clearly contentious, though the safeguard here is<br />

that the researcher’s is only one voice in the<br />

community of scholars (Kemmis 1982). Critical<br />

theorists as researchers have been hoisted by their<br />

own petard, for if they are to become more than<br />

merely negative Jeremiahs and sceptics, berating<br />

a particular social order that is dominated by<br />

scientism and instrumental rationality (Eagleton<br />

1991; Wardekker and Miedama 1997), then they<br />

have to generate a positive agenda, but in so doing<br />

they are violating the traditional objectivity of<br />

researchers. Because their focus is on an ideological<br />

agenda, they themselves cannot avoid acting<br />

ideologically (Morrison 1995a).<br />

Claims have been made for the power of action<br />

research to empower participants as researchers<br />

(e.g. Carr and Kemmis 1986; Grundy 1987). This<br />

might be over-optimistic in a world in which power<br />

is often through statute; the reality of political<br />

power seldom extends to teachers. That teachers<br />

might be able to exercise some power in schools<br />

but that this has little effect on the workings<br />

of society at large was caught in Bernstein’s<br />

(1970) famous comment that ‘education cannot<br />

compensate for society’. Giving action researchers<br />

asmalldegreeofpower(toresearchtheirown<br />

situations) has little effect on the real locus<br />

of power and decision-making, which often lies<br />

outside the control of action researchers. Is action<br />

research genuinely and full-bloodedly empowering<br />

and emancipatory Where is the evidence<br />

Critical theory and curriculum research<br />

For research methods, the tenets of critical theory<br />

suggest their own substantive fields of enquiry<br />

and their own methods (e.g. ideology critique and<br />

action research). Beyond that the contribution to<br />

this text on empirical research methods is perhaps

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