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Index of Paper Presentations for the Parallel Sessions - Academy of ...

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incurs three types <strong>of</strong> costs (Williamson, 1973): agency costs, transaction costs and teamproduction costs. Agency costs are incurred by NACO when it is unable to detect opportunisticbehaviour by lower ranking organizations (e.g. SACS) and o<strong>the</strong>r stakeholder such as CBOs andSMOs. Transaction costs arise out <strong>of</strong> a need to negotiate, monitor and en<strong>for</strong>ce contracts among<strong>the</strong> parties involved. Finally, team production costs arise ei<strong>the</strong>r because NACO fails to detect <strong>the</strong>underper<strong>for</strong>mance <strong>of</strong> organizations who are assigned key responsibilities, or NACO allocatesresources in excess <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se organizations‘ needs.Since each governance structure incurs different costs, <strong>the</strong> best organizational structure isone that ensures increased efficiency and higher effectiveness in achieving <strong>the</strong> proposedobjective. For example, transactions costs (e.g. monitoring) <strong>of</strong> using a hierarchical organizationare likely to rise with <strong>the</strong> increase in number <strong>of</strong> parties involved and how <strong>the</strong>se parties aregeographically dispersed, as it seems to be <strong>the</strong> case in NACP-III. These costs may be lower in aprice system; however agency costs are likely to rise as NACO may not be able to identifyopportunistic behaviours within a geographically dispersed set <strong>of</strong> SMOs and CBOs.Intuitively, transaction costs can explain not only <strong>the</strong> firm‘s boundaries, but also <strong>the</strong>control <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> central government over each state and o<strong>the</strong>r lower level governments and NGOs inits actions against HIV/AIDS. That is, if <strong>the</strong> state/UT‘s per<strong>for</strong>mance is difficult to measure andNACO believes it knows best what actions need to be taken, <strong>the</strong>n hierarchical control needs to beimplemented. This seems to have been <strong>the</strong> case in NACP-I. However, if <strong>the</strong> central governmentlacks <strong>the</strong> capabilities to effectively and efficiently reach all <strong>the</strong> HIV/AIDS target groups, <strong>the</strong>n amarket system would be <strong>the</strong> most suitable as selected NGOs assume <strong>the</strong> responsibility on behalf<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> central government. This takes us <strong>the</strong>n to our final <strong>the</strong>me, <strong>the</strong> capabilities required by <strong>the</strong>government to successfully move from a hierarchical governance structure to a hybrid structurewith <strong>the</strong> implementation <strong>of</strong> NACP-III.Gaps in capabilities

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