Polemic on General Line of International ... - From Marx to Mao

position and could therefore step up their policy of “beingfriendly to enemies and tough with friends”.In 1958 the leadership of the CPSU put forward unreasonabledemands designed to bring China under Soviet militarycontrol. These unreasonable demands were rightly and firmlyrejected by the Chinese Government. Not long afterwards,in June 1959, the Soviet Government unilaterally tore up theagreement on new technology for national defense concludedbetween China and the Soviet Union in October 1957, and refusedto provide China with a sample of an atomic bomb andtechnical data concerning its manufacture.Then, on the eve of Khrushchov’s visit to the United States,ignoring China’s repeated objections the leadership of theCPSU rushed out the TASS statement of September 9 on theSino-Indian border incident, siding with the Indian reactionaries.In this way, the leadership of the CPSU broughtthe differences between China and the Soviet Union right intothe open before the whole world.The tearing up of the agreement on new technology fornational defence by the leadership of the CPSU and its issuanceof the statement on the Sino-Indian border clash onthe eve of Khrushchov’s visit to the United States were presentationgifts to Eisenhower so as to curry favour with theU.S. imperialists and create the so-called “spirit of CampDavid”.The leaders of the CPSU and Soviet publications also levelledmany virulent attacks on the domestic and foreign policiesof the Chinese Communist Party. These attacks werealmost invariably led by Khrushchov himself. He insinuatedthat China’s socialist construction was “skipping over a stage”and was “equalitarian communism” 1 and that China’s People’sCommunes were “in essence reactionary”. 2 By innuendo he1N. S. Khrushchov, Report to the 21st Congress of the CPSU,January 1959.2N. S. Khrushchov, Conversation with the U.S. Senator H. H. Humphrey,December 1, 1958.77