Göteborgsbranden 1998 - Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och ...

Crisis management in the city districts
Information and support for those affected and their relatives were provided primarily
locally in the various city districts, thus through Gothenburg’s decentralised municipal
system. The city districts have their own crisis plans, some completely new and others
somewhat older when the fire took place, while still others lacked formal plans. Those city
district representatives interviewed for this study feel that their prearranged plans were
satisfactory and valuable as operational templates as well as mental preparation, and that
they also allowed flexible action in this specific situation.
The on-call workers manning the local crisis centre units in the city districts were
responsible for most of the information provided to those affected and their relatives. This
allowed those in need to receive information without an intermediary, as well as individual
crisis support. Telephone and fax, as well as new technologies such as Intranet and homepages,
were used to transfer information from central crisis management to the city
districts. The interviewed actors feel that this mostly worked well.
Another important aspect concerned information within each organisation. Staff members’
access to information was essential, not least in the way that it provided a feeling of
participation in the work. During the initial and most chaotic phase of the event, the flow
of information was broken at certain places and failed to reach all personnel groups. This
naturally caused some actors to feel excluded.
In this connection, we can also mention the importance of providing support to staff
members. Several of the interviewees bear witness to the importance of carefully attending
to which personnel need psychological support. In certain cases it is necessary to order people
to take time off or to use extant support systems, even if the individuals themselves do not
feel they need to.
In the local church that became an important gathering place there is uproar, due to the
onrush of people, but also because journalists force themselves between the Prime Minister
and the mourners with whom he is trying to speak. Here, church and city district officials
perceived media representatives to be so obtrusive that they were forbidden from practising
their profession on the premises. However, subsequent contacts mainly worked well.
In connection with the fire, there was much discussion on the antagonism among ethnic
groups, primarily concerning insufficient confidence in Swedish society. However, this
was only true of certain city districts and constituted an already existing mistrust – it was,
thus, not brought about by the fire. Since measures were taken to prevent ethnic antagonism,
e.g., local TV broadcasts in different languages with information on the fire and its
effects, there were no serious consequences in the city districts. In certain areas, the interviewed
actors also felt that the fire served partly to unite people (i.e., some groups that had
previously felt excluded from society now enjoyed legitimacy and participation) and,
thereby, increased confidence in Swedish society.
We can summarise the experiences at the city district level as follows:
Management and preparedness:
• The importance of mental preparation – the need for long-term planning in the form of a crisis
plan, partly to supervision of involved personnel, etc, and partly to what needs can arise
in the event of social disturbance.
255