Stony Brook University

that the moral qualities are the virtues of the good person. He has also derived an a priori
normative logic from the moral qualities. This logic determines the logical connections
among permissions and obligations. This suggests that virtue, justice, obligation and
moral freedom are grounded in these moral qualities themselves. Thus Leibniz has
established an a priori logic for the good person, derived from the moral qualities of right
and obligation. This is however only one part of Leibniz’s effort to clarify the notions of
right, just, and justice. The other part is the demonstration of the proposition ‘the good
person loves everyone.’
Section 5: Demonstration of ‘the good person is one who loves everyone.’
We may now turn to Leibniz’s demonstration of the proposition that resulted from
the epagogic induction. It may help to recall that the investigation began by examining
the terms right, just, and justice. The result of this was that love was found to be the
nature of justice, and thus the good (and just) person was defined as one who loves
universally. It is this definition that must now be made clear and distinct through
demonstration.
An important and pervasive feature of the Elementa is the “definition chain.” As
Leibniz had claimed earlier, if a definition is to be clear and distinct, it must be analyzed
fully, that is, demonstrated. Following the modes of right in Draft 5, this requirement is
carried out extensively. Through the course of it, Leibniz defines many terms that are
connected with his broader metaphysical notions, such as happiness, harmony, and
perfection—notions which have not been fully developed at this early stage in his career.
To recall the demonstrative method, a definition chain begins with a definition;
then, each term of the definiens is defined, and the terms of any subsequent definitions
are also defined, and so on, until all (or most) terms have been defined. Leibniz does not
make clear how the chain should terminate. But he appears to think it sufficient to show
that the definitions terminate in basic metaphysical assumptions. The most basic is
harmony, which is defined as “unity compensated by identity.” The definition
demonstrated here is “the good person is one who loves everyone.” The general result of
the demonstration is that the good person is one who has the knowledge of and striving
for the love (happiness and perfection) of everyone. In order to fulfill the requirements
justly, this “love” must be consistent with the good person’s own happiness. Thus the
result conforms to the requirements of the just condition, that one’s good be compatible
with the good of all others. These requirements are those of right. But what Leibniz
shows is that this requirement is made possible to perform by the principles of motive. To
show as clearly as possible how Leibniz does this, I have combined Drafts 5 and 6 of the
Elementa in a way that satisfies the most consistency, completeness, orderliness of
presentation, and faithfulness of intention. I have also numbered each defined word so
that one may see which definitions are included in others. I also provide some of
Leibniz’s comments on the definitions as well as my own reflections on what they mean.
The proposition to be demonstrated is: The good person is (1) one (2) who loves (3)
everyone. 137 What must be defined then are each of these terms, ‘person’ , ‘love’ , and
‘everyone.’
137 A.6.1.481 “VIR BONUS (a) qvisqvis amat (b) omnes (c).” Leibniz places letters next to these key terms,
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