Stony Brook University

And since charity is the habit of loving everyone, justice will be the
charity of the wise; not that the good man is unable to do what the wise
man is unable to do; but that he [the good man] acts from the prescription
of the wise. For those who are not good it may be required to add force
(vis), so that they may imitate the good. This prescription is called law. 68
Notable is that the passage begins with right as the science of the good and equitable, and
this leads us to the virtue of justice. We are then led to law, which provides the
prescriptive force or power for those who are insufficiently good—i.e., for those who are
lacking in moral power. This expresses the Biblical notion (Tim. 1, 2:8), frequently
expressed by Leibniz and others, that “the laws are not made for the just.” More
significantly, it expresses Leibniz’s conviction that moral obligation does not ultimately
depend on the force of law, the law of the superior, or fear of punishment. 69 It depends on
the will to do the good and on the knowledge of the good. The rest of the passage then
follows a familiar pattern: definitions of vir bonus, justice, wisdom, and then: “The
highest rule of right, in which consists the use of the science of love, is to pursue the
maximum general good.” 70 After this comes the usual outline of the three degrees. In sum
this paper shows that all of the major components of Leibniz practical philosophy can be
derived from right. This notion of imitation at the end is important, since eventually it
will be seen that “supreme virtue” consists in the imitation of God’s goodness.
The final paper to review begins similarly to the one above.
Right with which we are concerned is the science of charity, and justice is
the charity of the wise, or the virtue by which the affection of man toward
men is moderated by reason. Charity is the habit of loving everyone; and
the one who is thus disposed to charity is called the good person. Again
wisdom is the science of felicity. Felicity is in him but so that we may live
in the grace and love of God, whose power and perfection is the highest. 71
It should be noted that felicity enters here, not so much as a motive for gaining the good,
68 A.6.4.2857: “Jus in quo versamur est scientia boni et aequi. Nam vir bonus est qui amat omnes; sed cum
saepe plurium utilitates inter se pugnent affectus hominis erga hominem ratione moderandus est, et ad
cujusdam aequalitatis mensuram revocandus, ut vera non rebus tantum sed et personis pretia ponamus.
Itaque cum caritas sit habitus amandi omnes, justitia erit caritas sapientis; non quod vir bonus esse nequeat,
qui sapiens non est, sed quod aget ex praescripto sapientum, cui si vis addita sit cogendi etiam hos qui boni
non sunt, ut bonos imitentur, hoc praescriptum lex dicetur.” This piece also appears in Grua, Texts Inédits
608-12.
69 We will examine his arguments against Hobbes and Pufendorf in Chapter Six.
70 A.6.4.2858: “Summa juris regula est, in cujus usu scientia caritatis consistit, quaerendum esse bonum
maximum generale.” Some detailed indication of “the maximum general good” can be found in a piece
called De Summa Juris Regula (On the Highest Rule of Right, 1678). This piece details twelve “goods”
ranging from necessity, which Leibniz defines as “that without which we are miserable, to being prudent,
useful, devoted to virtue, possessing faculties in abundance, such that everyone has the knowledge, will,
and power to accomplish the best things”(A.6.4.2844).
71 A.6.2863: “Jus in quo versamur est scientia caritatis, et justitia caritas sapientis, sive virtus quae hominis
affectum erga hominem ratione moderatur. Caritas autem est habitus amandi omnes, et qui ita affectus est
vir bonus vocatur. Porro sapientia est scientia felicitatis. Felicitas autem in eo posita est, ut in Dei gratia
atque amore vivamus, cujus potentia et perfectio summa est.”
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