Stony Brook University

a virtue. But the central idea expressed here is the universal validity of the maxims of
justice. The fact that not everyone follows them says nothing against their universal,
normative, validity, nor their innateness. While the maxims have been “engraved in the
soul,” the fact that not everyone follows them simply means that the knowledge and
power of the maxims have been obscured by some other factor, as he will explain later.
What these maxims (or ‘laws,’ or ‘truths,’ as he interchangeably refers to them) of
justice specifically are, Leibniz does not say here. However, as the passage immediately
following the above shows, although less than clearly, they are not derived from sensual
instincts, nor are they known by instinct, but by reason.
Are we supposed to be maintaining that truths are in the understanding
independently of one another, as the Praetor’s edicts used to be on his
notice-board or album? I set aside for now the instinct which leads one
human being to love another; I will speak of it shortly, but for the moment
I wish to confine myself to truths in so far as they are known through
reason. (NE 1.2.2.89) 30
Especially important is that these rules are not identical with instincts. He explicitly “sets
aside” the instinct for love here and does not say that the maxims are known by an
instinct or sensation of pleasure or pain. At the same time, truths of whatever sort are
interrelated. Instincts as well as maxims of justice are all in some way related to each
other in the understanding. Quite likely, Leibniz is alluding to his doctrine of expression,
according to which all truths, including those of reason and instinct, “express” each other
to some degree or another. Truths are not known independently of each other, and only a
mind with innate capacities can make the connections. But the answer to how these truths
are known through reason is given a quite definitive answer here. The very next point
Leibniz considers is the demonstrability of these rules of justice. And here we return to
familiar ground.
I recognize too that certain rules of justice can be demonstrated in their
full extent and perfection only if we assume the existence of God and the
immortality of the soul, and that those [rules of justice] to which the
instinct of humanity does not impel us are engraved in the soul only as
other derivative truths are. However, those for whom justice is founded
only on the necessities of this life and on their own need for justice—
rather than the satisfaction which they ought to take in it, which is one of
the greatest satisfactions when God is its foundation—are apt to resemble
a community of thieves. ‘If there is a hope of escaping detection, they will
contaminate the sacred with the profane.’ (NE 89-90) 31
30 A.6.6.89: “Est ce qu’on s’imagine que nous voulons que les verités soient dans l’entendement, comme
independantes les unes des autres, et comme les edits du pretueur estoient dans son affice ou album? Je
mets à part icy l’instinct qui porte l’homme à aimer l’homme, dont je parleray tantost, car maintenant je ne
veux parler que des verités en tant qu’elles se connoissent par la raison.”
31 A.6.6.89-90: “Je reconnois aussi que certaines regles de la justice ne sauroient estre demonstrées dans
toutes leur étendue et perfection qu’en supposant l’existence de Dieu et l’immortalité de l’ame, et celles où
l’instinct de l’humanité ne nous pousse point ne sont gravée dans l’ame que comme d’autres verités
derivatives. Cependant ceux qui ne fondent la justice que sur les necessités de cette vie et sur le besoin
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