Stony Brook University

(1). “A Person is one who (2) loves himself, that is, who is moved through
(2.2) pleasure or pain.” 138
It can be recalled that in the Nova Methodus ‘person’ is defined as ‘rational substance.’
Here, ‘person’ is defined in terms of psychophysical movement. This reflects Leibniz’s
unchanging claim that pleasure and pain are the ground of motivation. 139 He also
distinguishes person from animal, saying that “animals have no more pleasure (voluptas)
than a machine or mirror.” The implication is that pleasure and pain are relevant only to
beings with consciousness. 140 We can also anticipate that while a person is one who loves
himself, a good person is one who is moved by the pleasure and pain of another person.
But more substantially a Person is defined as a being that has a (1.1) will, as one who is
capable of thought, affection, desire, and pain. 141
(1.1) Will is the (1.1a) endeavor (or striving) of (1.1b) a cognizing being. 142
(1.1a) Endeavor is the beginning of action. 143
(1.1b) Cognition is an act in itself. 144
Leibniz’s remarks on this last definition can be paraphrased. Everything that affects itself
has a kind of memory and likewise a perception of (2.2b) harmony or disharmony, that is,
of (2.2) pleasure and pain (voluptatis et doloris). By comparing an old with a new feeling
or sense, a conscious being has also an opinion; this gives rise to the anticipation of a
future feeling, and at last to the feeling of striving, i.e., the will. Leibniz provides
definitions of additional terms, such as act, change, cause, and nature prius, but these are
not so important. This series of definitions terminates with a comment that sums up the
difference between cognition and sense: “Through thinking we measure [or discern]
essence, through feeling, we measure existence,” but action does not occur unless there is
a prior passion. 145 Thus, the will is the conscious striving toward (2.2b) harmony. This
just about terminates the definition of person, although additional details will arise.
(2.) “We love those whose (2.1) felicity (2.2) delights us.” 146 This is the definition
of love Leibniz has offered twice already. On the face of it, it may appear to be a very
inadequate way to think of love, especially in connection with justice. If another happens
not to delight us, then we may not be inclined to love him or her. But Leibniz does not
seem to mean mere delight, nor of course does he mean sexual love. He distinguishes
but not to any others. I use numbers and letters to mark all defined terms.
138 A.6.1.466: “Persona est qvisqvis amat se seu qvisqvis voluptate vel dolore afficitur.”
139 Indeed, in the Nouveaux essais, they are one part of what makes “la morale” a demonstrative science, as
we will see in Chapter Five.
140 This reflects Leibniz’s early Cartesian view that animals do not have sensations or souls, a position he
later came to reject. It also reflects his yet to be developed doctrine of petites perceptions. But it is not
necessary here to enter into Leibniz’s complex views on sensation, perception, and apperception.
141 A.6.1.482: Persona est cuius aliqva voluntas est. Seu cuius datur cogitatio, affectus, voluptas, dolor.
142 A.6.1.482: “Voluntas est conatus cogitantis.”
143 A.6.483: “Conatus est initium actionis.”
144 A.6.1.483: “Cogitatio est actio in seipsum.”
145 A. 6.1.483: “Cogitatione essentiam , sensu existentiam metimur. Ita efficiens est tempore prius effecto,
sed actio non est nisi natura prior passione.”
146 A.6.1.466 and 482: “AMAMUS eum cuius felicitate delectamur.”
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