Stony Brook University

above, “the right of peace rules so long as one does not instigate a war.” Hobbes does not
have the “two-fold quality” that makes right imply an obligation. For Leibniz, natural
right is not a power simpliciter, but a moral power, which means the power not to violate
the right of another. Furthermore, on the level of strict right, each person is regarded
equally, not by virtue of an equal capacity to overpower another, but by the moral
capacity each person has to maintain peaceful coexistence. 102 Therefore, the precept of
strict right, based on the moral qualities, distinguishes Leibniz from Hobbes.
This difference is further made here by Leibniz’s discussion of our power over
things, that is, our power of acquiring and possessing them. While the right and
obligation of peaceful coexistence holds among rational persons, the right of war
characterizes our relations with respect to things (or non-persons). As he says, just as a
lion is permitted (licet) to destroy a man, and an avalanche to crush him, men are
permitted to restrain the lion, and to mine the mountain. Thus we have a right to
possession through capturing and conquering things, and the right of war to keep them, as
long as they are not already possessed by other persons. 103 Leibniz is clear that taking
another’s rightfully acquired possessions gives the right of war to the other, and that
stealing constitutes a violation of the precept against harm. 104 To lie is also a harm, a
harm to the mind; and from this stems the requirement (necessitas) to keep promises.
Offenses then are covered under the precept of strict right: “harm no one, so that the right
of war may not be given.” 105 It may be said that Leibniz thus follows Grotius and earlier
rights theorists who maintained that subjective right is a power permitting one (or
authorizing one) to acquire, control, and maintain property.
Leibniz concludes the section on “strict right” by mentioning two important
Aristotelian terms that he does not explain here. He says that the precept against harm
“pertains to Commutative justice, and to [the] Right, which Grotius calls faculty.” 106
These terms, ‘commutative’ and ‘faculty,’ are used differently by different authors, and
Leibniz uses them as short hand in later texts. So, it is important to have some sense of
what he means by them. I will first discuss ‘commutative’ and then ‘faculty.’ In
Nicomachean Ethics (Bk. V chap. 3-4), Aristotle discusses two kinds of justice: (1)
distributive and (2) commutative. As for (1) he defines ‘the just’ as a proportion in which
goods are distributed according to merit. For example, “the common funds of a
partnership [will be distributed] according to the same ratio which the funds put into the
business by the partners bear to one another.” 107 Thus, when goods are distributed in
102
This will be shown in the second degree of right. Leibniz will claim that we naturally seek not merely
peaceful coexistence, but also the improvement of society as a whole. Thus the precept against harm is a
negative right, since it commands us to refrain from doing wrong, but the second precept (give each his
due) commands us to act benevolently and is thus a positive right.
103
A.6.1.343.§73: “Victoria autem personae super rem reique captivitas dicitur possessio. Possessio igitur
dat personae Jus in rem, Jure belli, dummodo res sit nullius.”
104
A.6.1.343.§73: “Si igitur alterum alter vel in persona, vel rebus suis laesit, dat ei Jus quod habet in rem
seu Jus belli.”
105
A.6.1.343.§73: “Est autem et inter laesionis species deceptio perniciosa, qua damnum datur menti, ex
quo descendit servandorum promissorum necessitas. Ex quo patet Juris Naturae meri unicum praeceptum
esse: Neminem laedere, ne detur ei Jus belli.”
106
A.6.1.343.§73: “Huc pertinet Justitia Commutativa, et Jus, quod Grotius vocat Facultatem.”
107
AE 1131b29-31. So, for example, if partner A had put in 50 drachmas to start the olive business, while
partner B had put in 100 drachmas, A would get 34% of the profits, while B would get 66%. This is not
Aristotle’s example, but it illustrates the point.
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