Stony Brook University

what is not unjust—to do what you will when no issue is involved. Right
is the power of doing what is just. (LL 137) 111
Let us take these propositions one by one. The definition of justice is repeated here,
except that it contains not only the habit of doing, but of expecting. Perhaps this is
because virtue consists partly in a state of readiness to perform just acts, rather than in a
passive state. We can also assume that justice is the virtue of being just. However, the
just has not been clearly defined in the investigation, except negatively. The epagogic
induction rejected every proposed definition of the just, without clearly indicating any
acceptable ones. So, how do we define it? There are several indications: First, here it
appears to be synonymous with the permissible, although this is unhelpfully defined as
whatever is not unjust. Yet this appears to refer to acts of choice that affect no one, such
as, say, when I eat an apple that belongs to me. Secondly, it seems that the just can be
defined positively after all, as equity or the equitable (aeqvum). Leibniz had spent
considerable effort in Draft 2 attempting to define the just in terms of an equitable
proportion of good. As we have also seen, ‘equity’ names the second degree of natural
right, whose precept is “give to each his due.” It is fair to say then that the just and equity
are coextensive. Furthermore, equitable is defined in the above paragraph as “loving
everyone whenever an occasion arises.” This certainly defines the just in a positive sense.
In addition, this definition actually expands the scope of the just, to include not merely
loving one other, but loving every other. So, then, it is just to love everyone. What
remains undetermined here is this rather vague expression, “whenever an occasion
arises.” This may refer to the occasions referred to above, such as when another needs
help and we can provide it, or when we can provide the good for another at no loss to
ourselves. I suggest that these occasions will be better specified by the arguments for the
Golden Rule and the three degrees of natural right Leibniz develops later (see Chapter
Six).
Another way to define the just is in terms of Condition A, the means-end
condition. Leibniz rejects the idea that it is just to act from the motive of reward and
punishment, since this may result in using another as a means to one’s own ends.
Therefore, the opposite will be just—i.e., not to use others for one’s own ends. This may
appear to be a negative rather than positive determination (it does not tell us what is
permissible, but only what is impermissible). However, it could just as well be rendered
positively as, “it is just to promote the ends of others for the other’s own sake.” And this
is exactly what it means to love them. Thus I think we can conclude from this paragraph,
and thus from the investigation of the terms, that the just means to love everyone, without
harm to oneself.
The following proposition, however, is quite puzzling. In what sense are we
obligated, or indebted, to do that which is equitable, i.e., to love everyone? In one sense,
obligation itself, as we have seen from the Nova Methodus, stems from the moral power
111 A.6.1.465: “Est ergo, ut concludamus tandem aliqvando, vera perfectaqve Iustitiae definitio, habitus
amandi alio, seu capiendi voluptatem ex opinione boni alieni qvoties qvaestio incidit. Aeqvum est amare
alios omnes qvoties qvaestio incidit. Obligati sumus (debemus) ad id (id) qvod aeqvum est. Injustum est
bono alieno non delectari qvoties qvaestio incidit. Iustum (Licitum) est, qvicqvid injustum non est. Iustum
ergo est non tantum qvod aeqvum est, ut delectari bono alieno, cum qvaestio incidit, sed qvod non injustum
est, uti facere qvidis, qvoties non incidit. Ius est potentia agendi qvod justum est. ”
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