Stony Brook University

In the science of [right], rather, it is best to derive human justice, as from a
spring, from the divine, to make it complete. Surely the [notion] of the
just, no less than that of the true and the good, relates to God, and above
all to God, who is the measure of all things. And the rules which are
common certainly enter into the science, and ought to be considered in
universal jurisprudence, whose precepts natural theology will use as well
(RP 69). 14
This passage reflects three important and long-standing claims of Leibniz: (a) his view in
the Nova Methodus that “natural theology is a species of jurisprudence, universally
taken.” That is, jurisprudence is the science of the rule of a universal monarch, i.e., God
. 15 (b) Natural theology and natural right share the “common notions” that he speaks of in
the Meditation, as we will see below. (c) In the above two passages, Leibniz speaks of the
sources (capita) of natural right and the spring (fonte) of divine justice. These are two
essential principles. 16 Natural right is the source of the precepts of right, while divine
justice is synonymous with the charity of the wise. This way Leibniz’s ultimate definition
of justice as charity of the wise can be considered the complete definition of natural right.
The object of natural right is, in short, the virtue of justice.
(3) Having outlined the end and object of natural right, Leibniz at last deals with
the efficient cause of natural right and brings to bear his most provocative and influential
criticism of Pufendorf’s voluntarism. 17 It may seem unusual to speak of an efficient cause
of natural right, but this refers to the cause of the sense of obligation in the mind of a
person. Now, Pufendorf does not speak of efficient causes in relation to obligation. 18 He
does however discuss various causes of human actions, e.g., as arising from inclinations
and from the will. For Pufendorf the question is, how does an obligation constrain the
will to act according to a law (lex)? His answer is, by the command of a superior. But
Leibniz finds Pufendorf’s account incoherent.
To begin with Leibniz criticizes Pufendorf for having mistakenly grounded the
efficient cause of natural right in the decree of a superior, rather than where they ought to
be grounded—in the divine understanding.
It now remains to treat the efficient cause of natural right, which our
author does not correctly establish. He, indeed, does not find it in the
14 D 278: “Quin potius in scientia juris a divina justitia, tanquam fonte, humanam, ut plena fit, derivari
convenit. Notio certe justi non minus, quam veri ac boni etiam ad Deum pertinet, immo ad Deum magis,
tanquam mensuram ceterorum, communesque regulae utique in scientiam cadunt, & in jurisprudentia
universali tradi debent, cujus praeceptis etiam theologia naturalis utetur.
15 A.6.1.294.§5 “Nec mirum est, quod in Jurisprudentia, idem et in Theologia usu venire, quia Theologia
species quaedam est Jurisprudientiae universim sumtae, agit enim de Jure et Legibus obtinentibus in
Republica aut potius regno DEI super homines;”
16 In a paper of 1678 (A.6.4.2809) Leibniz outlines the following: “Juris Naturalis Principia et Derivata.
Principia Fons et Capita. Fons: Caritas Sapientis. Capita, jus strictum, aequitas, probitas, quae continentur
praeceptis: neminem laedere, suum cuique tribuere, honeste vivere.” He then does the derivation of Caritas
Sapientis, beginning with “Sapientia est Scientia felicitatis . . . Laetitia . . . Voluptas . . .” etc.
17 See Schneewind (1996) and Hochstrasser (2000 p. 79).
18 Pufendorf’s discussion of obligation is found in Book 1 Chapter 2 of De Officio Hominis et Civis juxta
Legem Naturalem libri duo, the chapter that Leibniz comments on, as seen below.
207