Stony Brook University

perceive and direct the harmonious felicity of all. Leibniz does not indicate how this
knowledge may be applied more specifically. Perhaps he thinks, like Aristotle, that no
philosophic account of the application of this knowledge is possible, and so it is sufficient
to leave the account to the judgment of the good person. The three degrees of right (ius
strictum, equity, and piety) might have provided clearer criteria for judgment, but
curiously Leibniz has not incorporated them explicitly into the definition of the good
person. Nevertheless, Leibniz’s intention to resolve the Carneadean problem and to
clarify the terms of right has been quite diligently carried out.
We may now turn to René Sève, one of the few commentators to have paid close
attention to Leibniz’s notion of ‘the good person.’ His critical remarks provide a useful
way of assessing the value of Leibniz’s effort in the Elementa. 191 Nevertheless, I think
Sève’s account of the grounds of obligation for Leibniz is not correct. First, Sève claims
that Leibniz’s attempt to define what is obligatory for the good man is circular.
Leibniz posits in effect that an action is permitted (or obligatory) if it is possible
(or necessary) for the good man. Now (the good man) was defined by the fact of
accomplishing always and only what is permitted or obligatory. [This amounts to]
the inclusion of the definiendum in the definiens, since an action will be permitted
(or obligatory) if it can be (or is) accomplished by the individual who
accomplishes only permitted and obligatory actions (Sève 110).
According to Sève, Leibniz is saying that the good man does what is permitted and
obligatory and what defines permitted and obligatory is what the good man does. But this
is not correct; Leibniz has defined a permitted action as a just action, which is whatever is
compatible with one’s own good and another’s. Also, the good person was defined at
length as one who loves everyone, and that in turn is defined as one who promotes
universal harmony. These two definitions do not result in a circular definition of what is
permitted and obligatory. Interestingly, Sève appears to acknowledge this, although in a
rather misleading way.
The sole response possible in our eyes consists in taking seriously the idea
according to which the good man, or better, the charitable sage, furnishes
the criteria of actions just or unjust. In effect we know that for Leibniz
‘objectively good’ is that which augments, or impedes the diminishment
of, the perfection of the universe [my emphasis], and that the good man
necessarily accomplishes these actions. These last can be then qualified as
obligatory and permitted. This observation allows us to refute the circle
just exposed. It appears then that the good man is not defined as in a
legalistic perspective, by the submission to rules, but inversely the rules
are defined in respect to him. In consequence, the inclusion of the
definiendum (the permitted or obligatory) in the definiens (the good man)
is eclipsed and the circle with it. This solution [however] does not
eliminate all the difficulties, as we are going to see. (Sève 110)
Thus Sève manages to show how Leibniz avoids the circle that Sève constructed for him.
191 I have translated these passages from Sève’s Leibniz et l’ École moderne du droit naturel, 1989.
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