Stony Brook University

another.
Leibniz’s “epagogic” induction is practically complete. After having investigated
the terms right, just, and justice from many angles, he has “induced” that love is the
nature of justice. He does not claim that love is the platonic idea of justice, nor explicitly
that he has deduced the clear and distinct idea of justice. But he shows that the original
intuition concerning justice is explained by love. This marks the permanent “induction,”
in another sense, of the theme of love into Leibniz’s practical philosophy.
Now it remains to formally define justice as a consequence of the induction, as
well as to draw conclusions about the other terms, right and just. The penultimate
paragraph in Draft 4 says the following:
Justice will therefore be the habit of loving others (or seeking the good of
others itself and of taking delight in the good of others), as long as this can
be done prudently (or as long as this is not a cause of greater pain. (LL
137) 108
Notably, justice is now defined in terms very much like a virtue: the habit of loving
others. This shows that justice not only corresponds with the performance of just acts, but
performing them is to be the result of a mind inclined by the acquired disposition to
perform them, by an internal disposition and intention. Also notable is that Leibniz
qualifies the last remark on prudence by saying, “Yet it may not be pertinent to call in
prudence here, for even one who believes, though foolishly, that the good of others is
unrelated to his own pain is nonetheless obligated to them.” 109 This seems to assert once
again that prudence alone is not a sufficient determination of justice or obligation, and
thus neither is one’s own pleasure or pain. I might believe that it is prudent for me to
avoid helping another out of a jam, but I may still have an obligation to do so, whether
fulfilling it causes me pain or not. To make this work, however, Leibniz is committed to
saying that I must find some pleasure in performing a task that is itself unpleasureable.
This may seem paradoxical; yet he does in fact think that if one does not find pleasure in
just acts, then one must be trained to find it. 110
In the final paragraph Leibniz offers a summary of the conclusions to his whole
investigation; but this will require some sorting out.
To reach a conclusion at last, the true and perfect definition of justice is
therefore the habit of loving others, or of finding joy in the expectation of
the good of others, whenever an occasion arises. It is equitable to love
everyone else whenever an occasion arises. We are obligated (we ought)
to do that which is equitable. It is unjust not to be delighted in the good of
others [whenever an occasion arises to be just]. The just (the permissible)
is whatever is not unjust. Therefore the just is not merely what is
equitable—to delight in the good of others when the issue arises—but also
108 A.6.1.465: “Iustitia ergo erit habitus amandi alios (seu per se expetendi bonum alienum, bono alieno
delectandi) qvousqve per prudentiam fieri potest (seu qvousqve majoris doloris causa non est).”
109 A.6.1.465: “Qvanqvam non sit e re prudentiam hic advocari, nam etiam qvi stulte, tamen credit, bonum
alienum versari, sine dolore suo, obligatus est tamen.”
110 See Chapter Six.
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