Stony Brook University

sacrifice our own happiness for the sake of others. Only in this way can we be motivated
to become as virtuous as we ought to be. In this way, honor is useful to others, as Cicero
says, and our own good is not lost.
It might be objected however that if there are already criteria for honor, then all that
divine guarantees offer are motives to do what is required. Thus it superfluous to the
meaning of honor to ground it on demonstrative proofs for the immortality of the soul
and for God’s existence. What appears to be more morally praiseworthy is to have the
virtue of honor, without requiring these motives for it.
There is another aspect to piety in the Codex that is somewhat different, since it does
not appeal to motives but rather to the grounds for certain duties, namely, the duty not to
harm oneself or one’s own property. These duties, since they do not directly concern
others, cannot be prohibited by positive laws. However, they are “still prohibited by
natural [right], that is, by the eternal laws of the divine monarchy, since we owe ourselves
and every thing to God” (RC 174). As God’s creations, we belong to God; thus our duty
is to respect what is essentially his property. Leibniz also claims that duties to ourselves
imply duties to the state: since the state has an interest in the common good; and since the
common good depends on the individual good, we are obligated to the state not to inflict
harm on ourselves. Yet Leibniz thinks this duty rests ultimately on universal (or divine)
justice:
Now if it is of interest to the state, of how much more interest is it to the
universe that no one use badly what is his? So it is from this that the
highest precept [of right] receives its force, which commands us to live
honorably (that is, piously). (RC 174) 113
Leibniz could argue that since one would not want one’s own property destroyed or
abused, one is obliged not abuse God’s property and universal interest. I cannot treat my
body and possessions in a way that God has not and would not. The moral force of this
argument depends of course on the persuasiveness of the idea that God exists.
Leibniz’s discussion of the three degrees ends at this point: “Thus I have treated the
three precepts of [right] or the three degrees of justice, in the most fitting way, and have
indicated the sources of natural [right]” (RC 174). 114 The “sources,” are subjective right
(jus as a moral power) and the definition of justice as charity of the wise. He has
essentially shown that justice is perfected by God’s guarantee of eternal reward and
punishment. While the precepts have been given a decidedly religious cast, they are not at
all dependent on egoistic motives, as other commentators have claimed. The only motives
they depend on are the assumptions of immortality and God’s existence. But these are
offered as incentives to act virtuously; they do not define virtue or honor. The virtue of
honor is the highest moral power.
113 A 4.5.63: “Nam ut Reipublicae, ita multo magis Universi interest, ne quis re sua male utatur. Itaque hinc
supremum illud juris praeceptum vim accepit, quod honeste (id est pie) vivere jubet.”
114 A.4.5.63: “Ita tria juris praecepta, tresve justitiae gradus, commodissime explicasse nobis videmur,
fontesque juris naturalis designavisse.”
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