Stony Brook University

one’s possessions), which right may be called simply self-defense. However, these rights
are restricted by the obligation not to violate another’s rights to the same. Since each
subject has these rights by definition, each subject is by definition forbidden to violate the
rights of another. The right to one’s body includes the Faculty to acquire, use, own, or
otherwise control things, but not persons. The right of coercion is the right to punish
another for injury to one’s body or for impeding one’s right to acquire things that belong
to no one (discussed below). All of these rights follow directly from the moral quality of
right and obligation, the moral quality of rational substance. Leibniz does not explain
how these rights follow, but it can be fairly assumed that they follow since they are
required for both the preservation of self and of society. The freedom over one’s body
must also include the freedom to acquire things necessary for its preservation, as well as
the right to defend oneself against injury to one’s body. Furthermore, since a moral power
is the power to do what is consistent with public utility, these rights, which everyone
possesses, must also be consistent with public utility.
In §17 Leibniz shows more specifically how these rights are derived from the
moral quality; in fact, it is shown that moral quality is the source of laws under a civil
contract. To begin the section he says, “The cause of moral quality is nature and action.
Nature is the cause of freedom and faculty, and in another, corresponds to the obligation
not to impede.” 66 Once again, this is an expression of the two-fold quality of right and
obligation, although the emphasis is on the obligation that another person has toward
oneself. But what is meant by ‘cause’ and ‘nature’ here is not entirely clear. Presumably,
Leibniz does not mean that the efficient cause of the moral qualities is material nature;
rather, he means that the reason or source of the moral qualities is the nature of rational
substance. The meaning of ‘action’ is more complex. It means the right of force or
coercion (potestas) in relation to (1) the possession of things, (2) restitution in case of
injury to one’s rights, and (3) the maintenance of rights and obligations under
convention. 67 To paraphrase, (1) I have a material right to possession, first over my own
body, which is the right of liberty. This right to possession of my body also grants me a
right to possess things that belong to no one, which right is called faculty (facultas). This
right gives rise to an obligation in the other not to take what I have rightfully acquired.
(2) If this right is violated, it is called injury, and when I am injured in the pure state of
nature, I have the right of coercive force against the violator. This right may be called
“the right of war.” 68 The right of war is given because injury impedes the rights of
freedom, faculty, and force. Injury in the state of nature harms not just a person, but the
whole community; and so injury is the source of the right to punish offenses. 69 This does
not mean that the state of nature is a state of war, since the right of war is not a right to
everything, but only a coercive right against injury. 70 But it means that injury (the
violation of rights) authorizes self-defense. This authorization is the basis for (3) the right
of convention, in which individuals, through mutual promise and acceptance, transfer the
66
A.6.1.303.§17: “Causa Qualitatis Moralis est Natura et Actio. Natura est causa Libertatis et Facultatis et
correspondentis in alio obligationis de non impediendo.”
67
A.6.1.303.§17: “Actio est causa potestatis in persona agente, ad aliquid faciendum, vel in seipsa, aut
rebus suis patiendum estque vel possessio vel injuria vel conventio.”
68
A.6.1.303.§17: “Injuria in statu mere naturali dat laeso jus libertatis, facultatis potestatisque omnimodae,
seu Jus belli in laedentem societatis ruptorem.”
69
A.6.1.303.§17: “Injuria igitur fons est delictorum et quasi deliktorum.”
70
For Leibniz the state of nature is already a state of community, as it is for Aristotle and Grotius.
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