Stony Brook University

Once again, as was to be shown, duty is not divorced from prudence; there is no
dichotomy between own and other good. This has been shown out of the definition of
right as moral power and obligation as moral necessity. 74
So it can be seen how Leibniz “clarifies” (if not makes distinct) the common
assumption of right, by showing what it implies—the definition of right as moral power
and obligation. This is a highly significant result, since the investigation into the “general
agreement” about Right leads to the themes of pleasure, happiness, and love. But what is
most significant is that these themes are brought in as the explanatory principles of
motivation, but not as grounding principles of right. This should raise a serious question
about interpretations of Leibniz’s practical philosophy that assume that natural right is
grounded in these motivational principles. It must be understood, rather, that Leibniz
introduces pleasure, happiness, and love, not as the grounds of right, but rather as
explanations for how it is possible to do what right requires. That is, they are descriptive
principles of motivation that explain how it is possible to act such that the prescriptive
demands of right may be carried out. The subjective power of right entails permissions
and obligations; but it is up to the metaphysics of pleasure, happiness, love (and
eventually perfection) to figure out how the prescribed duties are to be fulfilled. I will
come back to this point, since it arises within the investigation on justice.
After having established that right entails own and other good, Leibniz turns to
justice: “It remains [for us] to see to what extent there is in justice a basis for considering
the good of others.” 75 In other words, although it has been assumed above, it has not yet
been shown, that the meaning of justice entails another’s good. This is what he now sets
out to do. The following paragraphs, however, do not take up this problem in a direct
manner, but rather pass through a number of points related to what is unjust, to what is
the just, to justice as a virtue, to the nature of love, and then finally to the ultimate
definition of justice, concluding Draft 4. I will follow this order and emphasize the most
important points. 76
First, Leibniz considers a number of “generally agreed claims” in regard to what
is unjust, calling them “causes of complaints” (causa qverelarum). 77 His argument is not
especially consequential, but it serves to show that what is objectionable in unjust acts is
not only the act itself, (i.e., its unjust effects) but the will and intention of the agent. First,
he cites a number of cases in which “all would proclaim that an injury has been done.”
74 This point seems to have been overlooked by previous commentators on this draft of the Elementa
(Mulvaney, Schneiders, Busche, and Brown, for example), who pay more attention to the investigation of
iustum and iustitia. They do not mention that right is part of the investigation, and furthermore, often do not
sort out Leibniz’s distinctions among ius, iustum, and iustitia. Brown (1995) however recognizes that
“implicitly at work in this argument, of course, is the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can.’” He also usefully
remarks that “It is against this background [i.e., Grotian appetitus societatis and Hobbesian egoism] that we
must understand the intrusion of a theory of motivation into Leibniz’s theory of obligation” (Brown 417).
However, Brown shows that for Leibniz obligations are grounded in egoistic desire and prudence,
consistent neverthless, with altruism (Brown’s argument is compromised by silently excising Leibniz’s
definition of love from the paragraph on right). But this obscures Leibniz’s argument. The theory of
motivation Leibniz has inserted here is clearly a descriptive supplement to his already established definition
of right. Right is not grounded in these prudential motives, but in the moral nature of rational substance.
75 A.6.1.461: “Superest videamus, qvousqve in justitia boni alieni ratio habeatur.”
76 To understand what he is doing it is important to see how the argument develops.
77 These causa qverelarum are different from the raisons de se plaindre he makes use of in the Meditation
(1703).
63