Stony Brook University

It is not quite clear what he means by the principle he has “just pointed out” that leads us
to pursue joy and avoid sorrow. He means either that that principle itself leads us to
pursue pleasure and avoid pain, or he is referring to the “engraved” rules of justice that
are “necessary for our survival and true welfare.” But what matters most here is the
distinction between joy and happiness. The immediate and apparent good (what gives us
joy) must be distinguished from the lasting and rational good (what gives us happiness).
The feeling of joy inclines us to pursue objects of joy, while reason inclines us to pursue
objects of happiness. This distinction is further clarified and corroborated in a later
Chapter, 36 where Leibniz speaks of “appetitions” as the first movements of the soul
toward joy.
These ‘appetitions’, whether small or large, are what the Scholastics call
motus primo primi, and they are truly the first steps that nature makes us
take; not so much towards happiness as towards joy, since in them one
looks only to the present; but experience and reason teach us to govern
and moderate them so that they can lead us to happiness. . . . By rushing
straight at a present pleasure we sometimes fall into the abyss of misery.
(NE 2.21.36.189) 37
Since these appetitions, or inclinations for joy, can lead us to misery, we require reason
and experience to lead us to “rational joys and enlightened pleasures” (NE 2.21.36.190).
Quite likely Leibniz is simply referring to eudaimonian happiness, the sort of happiness
that results from the agent’s possession of moderate dispositions. That is, we can use
reason to direct the initial motive for joy into the disposition for rational action and longterm
happiness. On this basis we can better understand the passage that immediately
follows the one on page 90 quoted above.
Now an inclination which is expressed by the understanding becomes a
precept or practical truth – there being nothing in the soul which is not
expressed in the understanding, although not always in distinct actual
thinking, as I have sufficiently shown. (NE 1.2.3.90) 38
This is another passage reflecting Leibniz’s doctrine of expression—that whatever is
expressed in the soul (whether it is a rule of reason or a feeling) has some correlate in the
eviter la tristesse. Car la felicité n’est autre chose qu’une joye durable. Cependant nostre penchant va non
pas à la felicité proprement, mais à la joye, c’est à dire au present; c’est la raison qui porte à l’avenir et à la
durée.”
36 Book 2, Chapter 21 of NE, “On Power and Freedom.”
37 A.6.6.189: “Ces appetitions, petites ou grandes, sont ce qui s’appelle dans les écoles motus primo primi
et ce sont veritablement les premiers pas que la nature nous fait faire, non pas tant vers le bonheur que vers
la joye, car on n’y regarde que le present: mais l’experience et la raison apprennent à regler ces appetitions
et à les moderer pour qu’elles puissent conduire au bonheur. . . . allant droit vers le present plaisir nous
tombons quelques fois dans le precipice le la misere.”
38 A.6.6.90: “Or le penchant expremé par l’entendement passe en precepte, ou verité de pratique: et si le
penchant est inné, la verité l’est aussi, n’y ayant rien dans l’ame qui ne soit exprimé dans l’entendement
mais non pas tousjours par une consideration actuelle distincte, comme j’ay assez fair voir.”
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