Stony Brook University

were instituted by men for the sake of interest” and since interest is variable across times
and places, universal justice does not exist (GR. 79 sec v). (2) “Natural law is a chimera,”
if it means seeking the good of others, since, “nature prompts all men, and in general all
Animals, to seek their own particular advantage.” Thus Carneades concludes (according
to Grotius) “either there is no justice at all, or if there is any, it is extreme folly, because it
engages us to procure the Good of others, to our own prejudice” (GR 79). 4 In other
words, Carneades holds that since it is human nature to seek one’s own advantage, and
since justice demands that one act against one’s own advantage, justice is folly. To
oppose these claims Grotius asserts this universal principle:
Now amongst the things peculiar to man is the Desire of Society, that is, a
certain inclination to live with those of his own kind, not in any manner
whatever, but peaceably and in a community regulated according to the
best of his understanding; which disposition the Stoicks termed Oikeion.
Therefore, the saying that every creature is led by Nature to seek its own
private advantage, expressed thus universally, must not be granted. (GR
79-81) 5
This inclination or desire for society, he goes on to claim, allows us to act both in the
interest of ourselves and others. Grotius is not explicit, but his argument against
Carneades seems to be this: (1) the social inclination is universal human nature (and the
laws of reason that enable us to achieve society are also universal); (2) the social
inclination means that we seek our own good as well, since our own good is fulfilled in
the natural inclination for society. Therefore, we do not merely seek private advantage.
Furthermore, since justice demands that we seek the good of others, and since the good of
ourselves is fulfilled in this demand, justice is not folly. Carneades is entirely wrong.
Grotius’ argument should in fact be quite agreeable to Leibniz, insofar as it makes
one’s own good compatible with another’s good. But Leibniz seems to think that Grotius
has not done enough. What he really objects to is Grotius’ denial above that “every
creature is lead by nature to seek his private advantage.” He seems to take Grotius to
mean that justice entails the exclusion of one’s own advantage (although, on a charitable
reading, Grotius does not mean this). Yet Leibniz will forever insist, not simply that it is
folly not to seek one’s own advantage, but that it is impossible not to seek one’s own
advantage. The real issue for Leibniz is that Grotius has not sufficiently explained—that
the inclination for society does not sufficiently explain this: how one can act for another’s
good while simultaneously acting for one’s own good. That is, for Leibniz the social
inclination does not really explain how egoism and altruism can be consistent.
Furthermore (as can be gathered from the rest of the Elementa) it seems that Grotius does
not sufficiently explain just how much of one’s own good is consistent with another’s
good. Nor does Grotius explain how these inclinations, or any others, may be effectively
4 Grotius also opposes here a view stated by Horace, which is that “by naked nature was never understood
what’s just and right.” As Grotius will go on to show, our natural sociability, conformable with reason, is
the “fountain” of just and right.
5 GJ prolog. 6: “Inter haec [actiones] autem quae homini sunt propria, est appetitius societatis, id est
communitatis, non qualiscunque, sed tranquillae & pro sui intellectus modo ordinatae cum his qui sui sunt
generis quam oikeiosin Stoici appellabant. Quod ergo dicitur natura quodque animal ad suas tantum
utilitates ferri, ita universe sumtum concedi non debet.”
44