Stony Brook University

etween “fact” on one hand and “right” on the other: “Persons and things are terms of
fact, [while] power and obligation are terms of Right.” 31 It is thus the terms of right that
determine the rights belonging to persons and involving things. Hubertus Busche explains
the distinction this way: On one hand there is a quaestio facti and on the other a quaestio
juris. The former asks ‘in whose possession is thing y?’ while the latter asks ‘is thing y in
the possession of person x also the property of person x?’ As Busche puts it, “this latter
question has to do with normative criteria and can only be answered through a deduction
or proof of legality.” 32 For Leibniz, a deduction of legality can begin only with
definitions that are prior to fact, i.e., a priori definitions, not with conditions contingently
determined. Thus, the normative grounds of right are to be based on the definitions of the
terms of Right, i.e., jurisprudence, just, right, obligation, law, and property—as we will
see. We may wonder at this point what is the ontological and epistemological status of
these definitions, that is, what sort of thing are definitions and how do we know that these
are the correct definitions. Leibniz does not discuss that here. However, in the Elementa,
as we will see, he takes definitions to be “real” in a platonic sense and analyzes them
more rigorously. In the Nova Methodus, on the other hand, he seems to think it is
sufficient to set out the intensional content of a term, in which the content does not refer
to any factual or existing conditions. This may be seen in what follows.
Having established this methodological point, Leibniz now sets out an important
series of definitions, beginning with the term ‘jurisprudence.’
Jurisprudence is the science of actions, insofar as they are called just or
unjust. Just and unjust are what is useful or harmful to the public. To the
Public means first to the world, or to God, its Rector, and then to
Humanity, and finally to the State. 33
According to this passage, jurisprudence as a whole is the science of just actions, and just
actions are those that promote public utility. The specific components of this science will
be spelled out, below. But first it is important to note two main points: (1) Leibniz’s
frequent methodological device, that of presenting definitions in a series, or “definition
chain.” This is the first of a series that will include definitions of morality, right, and
obligation. 34 (2) It is important not to take this particular series of definitions as evidence
of Leibniz’s utilitarianism and voluntarism. 35 On the contrary, he is drawing Roman law
into a fundamentally platonic (perhaps neo-platonic) moral-political tradition. His
31 A.6.1.298.§10: “Personae enim et Res sunt facti, Potestas et Obligatio, etc. juris termini.” Note that
Leibniz often seems to use potentia and potestas interchangably.
32 Busche, p. 415 fn. 44: “Ein Rechtsfrage dagegen hat es mit normativen Kriterien zu tun und kann nur
durch eine Deduktion oder Prüfung der Legalität (bzw. Legitimität) beantwortet werden.”
33 A.6.1.300-301.§14: “Jurisprudentia est scientia acitonum [sic] quatenus justae vel injustae dicuntur.
Justum autem atque injustum est, quicquid publicè utile vel damnosum est. Publicè, id est, primum Mundo,
seu Rectori ejus Deo, deinde Generi Humano, denique Reipublicae.”
34 A much longer definition chain will be analyzed in his Elementa Juris Naturalis.
35 The passage might be taken in a voluntarist sense to mean that the just is what serve’s God’s interest and
follows his will, and thus, as for Thrasymachus, justice ultimately serves the interest of the Superior (God,
for Leibniz). However, as we will see, such a Thrasymachian interpretation leaves out Leibniz’s crucial
qualifications, established early on, that God’s interest conform to reason and goodness, and must if God is
to be revered. The meaning of ‘reason’ and ‘goodness’ does not depend solely on God’s will or power.
God’s power lies in God’s capacity to distribute reason and goodness, within metaphysical limits.
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