Stony Brook University

everyone to judge according to egoistic desires, then everyone could be harmed. But any
rule that justifies mutual harm is certainly inadequate. Therefore, the rule needs some
other standard. Now, suppose it is thought that the matter is to be settled by a “just will.”
That is, since the rule depends on what one wills, then one’s will must be determined by
what is just. Therefore Leibniz suggests that the rule needs a standard or measure for a
just will.
The measure Leibniz proposes, “the place of others” is quite interesting, although
it is only mentioned here. 53 It is used as the measure of a just will and thus for the Golden
Rule. This means that the proper perspective from which to determine the just or
equitable is the third person perspective, rather than the first. 54 The third person
perspective avoids the problem with the first person perspective, by forcing one to
consider what all others would not want done to them. One can well imagine that others
do not want to be harmed, and therefore one cannot equitably want “too much” of the
good for oneself. Furthermore, one can well imagine that others want the good done for
them, and so if it is possible to promote another’s good without doing harm to oneself,
then we would find promoting another’s good equitable as well. Thus, the second person
perspective shows how to judge more “equitably” and thus provides the true measure of a
just will. This is the standard or measure that Leibniz thinks must be applied to the
Golden Rule.
As interesting and effective as this “place of others” seems to be, Leibniz himself
noted that it had some limitations. In a paper called “La place d’autruy” (undated), he
discusses some of the fine points of this rule. He points out that one must not think that
the perspective of others is necessary for judging what is just, since we can still discern
that the other wills unjustly.
One can still distinguish the will that one would have, being in the place of
the other, which can be unjust, as for instance not wanting to pay, from the
judgment that one would then make, that one is always obliged to avow
that one must pay. The will is an inferior mark of judgment, but the one
and the other is not a certain mark of the truth, and serves only to arrest us,
to excite our attention, and to aid us in the knowledge of the consequences
and extent of the evils that this could give rise to in others. 55
Despite what oneself or another would want, one could still judge that one ought to pay
one’s debts. Thus one or another’s desires are insufficient to judge what is the just. In
addition, we may be mistaken about the justness of another’s will. At the same time,
however, when we take up the perspective of others and recognize the consequences of
53 He uses it in several places, most notably in the Mediation on the Common Notion of Justice, as we will
see, and he discusses it in more detail in an undated piece called “La place d’autruy,” found in Grua, pp.
699-702.
54 This observation is made by Emily Grosholz (1993).
55 Grua 701: “On peut encore distinguer la volonté qu’on auroit estant à la place de l’autre, qui peut estre
injuste, comme de ne vouloir point payer, et le judgement qu’on feroit alors, car on sera tousjours obligé
d’avouer qu’on doit payer. La volonté est une marque inférieur du judgement, mais l’un et l’autre n’est pas
une marque certaine de la verité, et ne sert qu’à nous arrester, à exciter nostre attention, et à nous aider dans
la connoissance des consequences et de la grandeur des maux que cela pourra faire naistre dans autruy.”
Note: Riley does not translate the last sentence.
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