Stony Brook University

nature of things and in the precepts of right reason conforming to [them],
which emanate from the divine understanding, but (what will be seen as
strange and liable to contradiction) in the decree of a superior. (RP 70) 19
Leibniz does not say exactly what the “precepts of right reason” are; but we can well
identify them as the precepts of natural right he has so often employed, as he does in the
Meditation, as we will see. But the key point here is his claim that the efficient cause of
natural right is the divine understanding, in which is found the natures of things
themselves (e.g., the nature of good actions). Thus, the decrees God wills are informed by
his understanding, as the decrees of any superior must be. Now, Pufendorf certainly
thinks that God’s decrees are always just. However, Leibniz goes on to show that
Pufendorf’s account of natural law (leges naturale) actually depends on a superior’s
power to impose an obligation, but does not depend on the superior having “just causes”
for his power. Citing Pufendorf’s De Officio Hominis et Civis, Leibniz observes:
Indeed, Book I, Chapter 1, § 1 defines ‘duty’ as “the action of a man duly
fitting to the prescript of the laws on the ground of an obligation.” And
then Chapter 2 § 2, defines ‘law’ as a decree by which the superior obliges
the subject to conform his actions to that prescript. (RP 70, with some
emendation) 20
In other words, a superior determines the law and thereby imposes duties by means of
obligations. Obligations are then imposed by the superior’s threat of punishment.
Leibniz’s objections are numerous and significant:
If we admit this then no one will do his duty spontaneously; also, there
will be no duty when there is no superior to compel observance; nor will
there be any duties for those who do not have a superior. And since,
according to the author, duty and acts prescribed by justice coincide
(because his whole natural jurisprudence is contained in the doctrine of
duty), it follows that all [right or law] is prescribed by a superior. 21
Thus, for Pufendorf, the whole of natural law reduces to the decree of a “superior.” We
will soon see how a superior is supposed to be determined. First, this claim about
“spontaneity” must be emphasized. In an earlier passage Pufendorf himself says that
“spontaneity” must be attributed to the will, if we are to say that a person acts voluntarily,
19 D 4.279: “Nunc superest de caussa efficiente juris naturae non bene auctore constituta dicam. Hanc enim
ille non in rerum naturae, rectaeque secundum hanc rationis praeceptis, a divina mente emanantibus, sed
(quod mirum & contradictioni obnoxium videbitur) in superioris decreto quaerit.”
20 D 4.279: “Nempe lib. I cap. I. § 1 officium definitur ‘actio hominis, pro ratione obligationis ad
praescriptum legum rite attemperata.’ Et moc cap. 2. § 2 Lex definitur decretum, quo superior sibi
subjectum obligat, ut ad istius praescriptum actiones suas componat.” Leibniz is quoting Pufendorf exactly.
I checked a 1769 edition of De Officio, although obviously Leibniz must be quoting the 1673 edition.
21 D 4.279: “Quae si admittimus, nemo sponte officium faciet; immo nullum erit officium, ubi nullus est
superior, qui necessitatem imponat; neque erunt officia in eos, qui superiorem non habent. Et quum auctori
officium & actus a justitia praescriptus aeque late pateant, quia tota ejus jurisprudentia naturalis in officii
doctrina continetur; consequens erit, omne jus a superiore decerni.”
208